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ABSTRACT 
 
To Detect or Not To Detect: 
Dual Process Models and Cognitive Failures 
 
by 
 
Alexander Benson Swan 
 
When faced with a decision regarding probability or heuristics, people generally show 
their bias toward a heuristic, even if it might be the wrong decision, such as on the classic 
base-rate neglect task (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). The crucial question is whether people 
know that they are focused on this bias. Recent dual process theories (DPTs) have 
incorporated the crucial role of conflict detection and resolution to better explain why people 
are biased on classic reasoning and judgment tasks. Two recent models, the Logical Intuition 
Model (De Neys, 2012) and the Three-stages Model (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 
2015) suggest that the source of errors and bias can be explained in two distinct ways. The 
Logical Intuition Model postulates that people are generally efficient and routine conflict 
detectors and that errors are due to a failure to inhibit an initial, intuitive response. The 
Three-stages Model claims that detection is imperfect and that the detection mechanism is 
the main source of errors because people do not recognize that they are making biased 
decisions. These claims were investigated in a series of three experiments. In Experiment 1, 
participants completed a modified base-rate neglect task. In Experiment 2, a conditional 
 xiii 
 
reasoning task was added to test whether the claims of the two base-rate neglect models 
would transfer to a qualitatively different task. In Experiment 3, participants were placed into 
four different groups where they were given one of two forms of false feedback, true 
feedback, or no feedback (control) in order to test whether feedback would interact with 
answer confidence and resultant intuitive or analytic processing correlates (such as response 
time). Across all three experiments, the Three-stages Model’s claim that 
monitoring/detection failures is the main source of bias on the base-rate neglect task was 
supported over the Logical Intuition Model’s claim of inhibition failures as the major source 
of bias. Experiments 2 and 3 support the explanation that these two models are task-specific 
to base-rate neglect, as conditional reasoning behavioral patterns did not support either model 
fully. Feedback did not have the predicted effects on accuracy, response times, or confidence. 
Implications of these findings regarding general dual process theory, including the impact of 
methodological limitations, are discussed. Small modifications to the Three-stages Model are 
offered to reflect the data presented here. 
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Chapter I. 
Introduction 
Humans are generally poor reasoners, especially when reasoning is based in logic or 
probability, and many are susceptible to beliefs and biases when making complex, or even 
simple, decisions. For example, in a recent episode of Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, 
Mr. Oliver described in excruciating detail the central, biased problem with science 
communication and consumption in our society: too much confirmation bias. Perhaps the 
summative point came from a clip of TV weatherman Al Roker, who suggested that a person 
should merely find a scientific study that confirms their beliefs and use it as evidence to 
justify their behaviors (Oliver & Pennolino, 2016). Of course, this is usually a bad idea, and 
clearly shows biased judgment and reasoning.  
So why are we so poor at reasoning? Perhaps the answer lies in the idea that there is a 
dual processing of information, and much of the susceptibility toward errors is due to the 
issues associated with one or both of those processing routes. Dual process theories (DPTs; 
see Table 1 for a list of acronyms used in this manuscript) have been investigated in 
cognitive psychology for over 50 years, but the issue extends much further into the history of 
psychology (Frankish & Evans, 2009). Though they are varied in their application and 
description, the main distinction in DPTs is that there is fast, heuristic, and automatic 
processing (Type 1, or T1) and slow, deliberate, and analytic processing (Type 2, or T2) 
(e.g., De Neys, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 2003, 2007; Frankish & Evans, 2009; 
Stanovich, 2009). Depending on the scientific investigation, there are essential factors to 
consider, such as the defining feature that separates the two types of processing, the related 
processing associated with each type for a given cognitive task, and the progression of 
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cognitive resources allocated to each type of processing over time (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). 
The goal of this dissertation is not to give an answer to each of these overarching 
issues in DPTs, but to focus on an important few. Recently, two theoretical models have been 
introduced that attempt to explain perhaps the most important cognitive aspect of DPTs: 
conflict detection and resolution (De Neys, 2012; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). 
Thus, the goals of this present set of studies were to (1) investigate these two models with 
their relevant behavioral predictions regarding conflict detection and resolution, including 
decision time, accuracy, and when and why the two routes defined above might be activated 
or ignored, (2) broaden the scope of these recent conflict detection models and their 
behavioral predictions from one major judgment/reasoning task to another task that is 
qualitatively distinct, and (3) to determine if a performance feedback intervention can 
mitigate the source of this bias and errors on these two tasks. 
Historical Background 
Although DPTs has been introduced and studied in various subfields in psychology, 
such as social psychology (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999) and educational 
psychology (Epstein, 1994), this dissertation focused on reasoning, judgment, and decision-
making (JDM; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Many of the current theories in DPTs are from 
a few authors in the reasoning field (e.g., De Neys, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 
2003, 2007; Frankish & Evans, 2009; Pennycook et al., 2015; Stanovich, 2009). Some of the 
early researchers have suggested that reasoning ability is based on the differentiation between 
implicit processes vs. explicit processes (Evans & Over, 1996), associative processing vs. 
rule-based processing (Sloman, 1996), or an automatic set of systems vs. an analytic system 
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(Stanovich, 2011). 
More specifically, Evans and Over (1996) argued that a dual process thinking 
architecture makes sense when viewed through a rationality lens. They claimed that 
instrumental rationality—achieving one’s goals—need not be tied to rules bound within logic 
or probability, but influenced by a person’s belief system. In other words, thinking progresses 
to achieve goals already contextualized by beliefs and prior knowledge (Frankish & Evans, 
2009). 
In parallel with Evans and Over (1996), Sloman (1996) was proposing his dual 
process theory. His paper was influential in instigating further investigations into dual 
processing, though he focused on the effects of reasoning (Frankish & Evans, 2009), counter 
to the approach of Evans and Over. The major contribution of Sloman’s paper was his 
argument that there was an associative system that was based on similarity (prior knowledge) 
and a rule-based system that processed the symbols of logic. Moreover, these two systems 
operated simultaneously, whereby the rule-based system could inhibit the associative system 
if a conflict of response outputs was found. 
Last, Stanovich (2009, 2011) added major nomenclature to the dual process debate 
(i.e., “System 1” and “System 2”), but more importantly, added individual differences 
hypotheses to the exploration. His idea was that T2 was linked to differences in general 
intelligence, whereby students with higher cognitive ability tend to do better on reasoning 
and judgment tasks (Frankish & Evans, 2009). Though the above researchers approached 
reasoning from different angles, it appears that there are similarities how they describe T1 
and T2 processing. It is clear there is strong overlap in the nomenclature used, as well as the 
synonymic nature of the theories. 
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Table 2 shows the related processing correlates for T1 and T2 that have been found in 
associated DPTs research (table adapted from Evans, 2008). T1 processing shows a 
relationship of fast and automatic thinking. Heuristic thinking, defined as an associative 
solution based on previous experience (e.g., a rule-of-thumb or an educated guess) when an 
exhaustive search is impractical or impossible, is also commonly used to identify T1. 
However, caution must be used here. In the realm of normative logical reasoning, a heuristic 
tends to be a naughty word, usually indicating that a person has gotten the reasoning problem 
wrong. This is not always the case; a reasoner can also arrive at a wrong decision using T2 
processing (Evans, 2012; Stanovich, 2011; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). 
As such, heuristic in the DPTs sense merely reflects a faster route of processing and 
shortcuts based heavily on probability and expected outcomes from experience. Indeed, 
heuristics are used based on the fact that they return a correct answer more often than chance 
expectation. Due to the automaticity of T1 processing, it is argued to be the default state, and 
T2 is only engaged when it is needed, acting as a shallow monitor to the former (this is 
described as default interventionism by Evans, 2007). By this logic, it appears that T1 guides 
the human experience on a daily basis. However, because following heuristics and shortcuts 
are not always the optimal decision, T2 should excel when the situation demands further 
reflection. 
Table 2 also shows T2 processing correlates. Overall, it describes that T2 thinking 
requires effort, is deliberate, and is empirically slower in decision-making (or rather, slower 
decisions are deemed to be caused by the activation of mental effort). Evans (2009) argues 
that the defining feature in DPTs is the engagement of working memory (WM), which is the 
act of engaging T2 processing. A simple problem might not necessarily need WM to achieve 
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a decision, which would suggest T1 thinking is sufficient. However, any instance where WM 
is loaded, the person is conscious of this load, which suggests that activation of WM 
components is the active engagement of T2 thinking (De Neys, 2006). Stanovich (2011) 
argues for a defining feature on a more conceptual level: the ability to cognitively decouple. 
Cognitive decoupling is an umbrella term associated with higher order thinking, such as 
counterfactual thinking, hypothetical thinking, and reflective thinking. A person’s ability to 
think about situations that are not presently occurring is the essence of cognitive decoupling 
and the engagement of T2 thinking. Both of these defining features strongly suggest the 
separation of T1 and T2 processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
Specifically, within the general cognitive function of reasoning, DPTs have included 
efforts to fine-tune T1 and T2 processing correlates. Initially, the distinction between two 
processing routes was investigated on the Wason selection task (Evans, 2008). On this task, 
participants are given a conditional statement and four corresponding cards. Two of the cards 
present the antecedent of the conditional and the absence of the antecedent, while the other 
two cards represent the presence of the consequent the absence of the consequent. Responses 
on this task were attributed to either a basic matching bias (matching the words in the 
conditional statement to the cards presented) or rationalization (a think-aloud protocol was 
utilized here to uncover the reasons why choices were made). This was further elaborated 
into a heuristic-analytic theory (Evans, 2008), where a heuristic answer is generally a 
preconscious judgment, whereas an analytic judgment involves working memory (WM), 
where previous knowledge is retrieved from long-term memory and examined more closely 
within the context of the reasoning problem or situation. In this theory, Evans draws a 
distinction between incorrect answers based on heuristics (such a matching bias) and the 
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utilization of WM processing to recognize that the correct answer on the task involves 
confirmation and falsification of a given rule. He argues that the use of WM is the 
instantiation of T2 processing, and therefore an analytic process. 
The majority of the historical investigations of dual processing have been focused on 
the belief bias effect. It was first proposed as a dual process effect by Evans and colleagues 
(Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). Briefly, the belief bias is the result of errors attributed to 
the mismatch in people’s prior beliefs and the normative deductive logicality of a syllogism. 
Essentially, people tend to accept conclusions that are believable and reject conclusions that 
are unbelievable. In a conventional belief bias paradigm, participants are asked to evaluate 
the conclusion of a syllogism (three statements, where the first two are premises to the 
argument and the third is the conclusion) on whether it is logically valid or invalid (usually 
these are deductive arguments). The researcher manipulates these problems to be valid or 
invalid as well as whether the conclusion is believable or unbelievable. The mismatch, or 
conflict, occurs when a believable argument is actually invalid or an unbelievable argument 
is actually valid. 
The robust findings show that the errors are a result of a strong focus on belief in the 
content of the conclusion, or what would be outputted by the heuristic route (T1). A person 
believes a conclusion to be true, even if it might be an invalid conclusion, and determines 
that the argument is valid. Upon further reflection, however, this person would incorporate 
the rules of logic into decision-making (activation of more analytic thinking, T2) and choose 
that the conclusion is invalid regardless of what his or her previous beliefs suggest. These 
data suggest that deductive reasoning is not black-and-white thinking, but that there are 
situations where heuristics (beliefs or other previous experiences) play a role in the decision-
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making process. 
This departure from reasoning as an all-or-nothing cognitive function is seated within 
a related debate about human rationality and dual processing. Reasoning paradigms generally 
have a right answer (so-called normative answers; Evans & Over, 1996; Evans, 2014; 
Frankish & Evans, 2009). For example, in deductive syllogistic reasoning, there are certain 
figures and moods that yield valid conclusions and there are other figures and moods that 
yield invalid conclusions (Evans et al., 1983). Due to this construction, and invention by 
humans, there is a normative answer that would be deemed correct. Based on performance on 
a deductive syllogistic reasoning task, a researcher can make a judgment regarding the 
reasoning ability of a group of participants. The researcher would invariably suggest that low 
performing people have poor reasoning skills, and possibly suggest that these people are 
irrational in some way. This may not be the case. Research has shown that, while people do 
make reasoning errors using T1 thinking, errors can be made when T2 thinking is firmly 
engaged (e.g., Thompson et al., 2011). Thompson and colleagues (Thompson et al., 2011) 
found that if you ask a person to make a quick decision, but allow them to rethink and reflect 
on their answer choice, this could lead to errors. If normative reasoning is to be taken as the 
golden rule, then it seems most (if not all) humans are irrational. Of course, Cohen (1981) 
has argued that this cannot be the case, no matter what experimental evidence in reasoning 
shows (see also Oaksford & Chater, 2001). While the current dissertation utilized the 
methodology of a normative reasoning task, it is not its intent to prescribe the idea that 
performance on the task has anything to say about the broader issue of human rationality, but 
rather speak to a lesser evil: bias. 
Last, DPTs is not a single, unified theory of thinking or reasoning. Rather, it is a class 
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of theories, each with a unique contribution to the discussion (Frankish & Evans, 2009), or 
could even be regarded as a metatheory (Pennycook et al., 2015). Due to this piecemeal 
approach, DPTs are not without detractors (Keren, 2013; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; 
Kruglanski, 2013; Osman, 2004). The overarching criticism is that DPTs are not 
parsimonious when compared with unimodal processing models where thinking and 
processing happen on a continuum (e.g., Osman, 2004). While many of the criticisms exist 
on a semantics/terminology level (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), there is one complaint by 
DPTs critics that is particularly compelling for the future of the class of theories. They argue 
that there is no straightforward model that accounts for when a heuristic answer conflicts 
with that of an analytical answer on a simple reasoning problem, or why a person would need 
a system that regulates these conflicts (e.g., Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). In response to 
this, researchers have recently modified their existing models and theories to incorporate the 
mechanism of conflict detection and resolution (Evans, 2007). Conflict detection can be 
broadly defined as the ability of the reasoner to recognize that a problem or context cues 
multiple, conflicting response outputs; conflict resolution can be broadly defined as the 
response output/behavior/judgment/solution (note that this resolution says nothing about the 
optimal or normative solution to a given problem; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Evans, 2007; 
Evans & Frankish, 2009). The present dissertation attempts to extend the discussion of 
conflict detection/resolution in DPTs and specifically test hypotheses and prediction of two 
recent models described below. 
Base-rate Neglect and Dual Process 
 Though DPTs in reasoning have been primarily investigated with the Wason selection 
task and the belief bias effect (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013), another research 
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avenue rich with heuristics has been explored. The creation of conflict detection and 
resolution models has utilized the base-rate neglect task for dual process exploration. 
Sometimes referred to as the “lawyer-engineer” problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), this 
task uses the tendency of people to ignore numerical information (base-rates) when making 
judgments about group membership. It is an effect of the representativeness heuristic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, imagine I sampled 100 people about their 
occupation and collected personality and trait descriptions of each person. Then imagine I 
tallied the occupations and determined that 70 were lawyers and 30 were engineers. I 
randomly select one individual from the sample and recite a description that sounds like a 
(stereo)typical engineer. I then ask a willing participant to determine to which group this 
person belongs (i.e., what group membership is most likely?). The neglect arises if the 
participant decides to ignore that the lawyer group had larger base-rate in my sample. This is 
due to incongruity of the base-rates and the description of the person (incongruent or conflict 
problems). If the breakdown of the base-rates were switched, where I had 70 engineers and 
30 lawyers, but the description of the randomly selected individual remained the same, 
participants tend to choose the larger group category quickly and with very little error. This is 
due to the congruity between the probability that 70 engineers having the larger chance of 
selection and description of my (stereo)typical engineer (congruent or nonconflict problems). 
The base-rate neglect task was first applied to DPTs by De Neys and Glumicic 
(2008). They decided it was a good task to get a high contrast in errors, considering that most 
people perform poorly when the base-rates and description are incongruous (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Following the base-rate judgment task, participants were asked to recall 
the base-rate information from a subset of the problems they had just seen. Amount correct 
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(accuracy) and response time (RT) were also assessed as dependent variables. 
A number of interesting predictions and findings came out of this study, since DPTs 
had not yet been applied to many of the heuristic literature. First, De Neys and Glumicic 
(2008) predicted that the answer cued by a stereotypical description would be chosen more 
often on problems where the base-rates and descriptions are incongruent than when they are 
congruent. This is perhaps the most intuitive prediction, and it represents the tendency of the 
participants to rely upon T1 processing and not entertain the base-rates or what those 
numbers mean probabilistically (a T2 executable). Second, they argued that a slower 
response time would be indicative of slower processing times, or the activation of analytic 
thinking and T2 deliberation. Moreover, the longest response time would reflect the idea that 
the incongruence between the correct answer and the more salient answer had been detected 
and the proper inhibition of that response was necessary to arrive at the correct answer. 
Third, proponents of DPTs had up until this point argued that recognizing the incongruence 
would be explicitly recalled and would be apparent from a think-aloud protocol. In other 
words, while solving these base-rate problems, participants would note that the base-rates 
and stereotype description did not match and make the corresponding adjustment to their 
judgments while saying that was the reason for the adjustment. Last, the recall task would 
add additional evidence that the incongruence would be recognized and that base-rates would 
be processed at a deeper level, benefiting recall. 
De Neys and Glumicic (2008) found support for all of these predictions, excluding 
the explicit recall, contrasting with the viewpoints of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). First, 
De Neys and Glumicic concluded that a conflict detection system operates constantly, able to 
activate when needed, and this operation is efficient (fast processing) and routine (normal). 
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Second, while this conflict detection system works well, resolving the conflict (inhibiting the 
compelling T1 response) separates individual into bias-susceptible or bias-resistant 
groupings. De Neys ultimately combined these observations into a single predictive model 
(De Neys, 2012). 
These conclusions have implications about the processing of the information, when 
that information is processed, and how it connects the two largest pieces of DPTs: T1 and T2 
processing. This has increased the conflict detection/monitoring mechanism’s role within 
recent and current DPTs investigations. Other researchers have more recently investigated 
base-rate neglect and have supported and advanced the initial De Neys and Glumicic (2008) 
conclusions (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & 
Thompson, 2014; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012). Pennycook et al. (2012) replicated De 
Neys and Glumicic (2008) with the extreme base-rate values used (e.g., 997 vs. 3), but could 
not replicate the effects when using the original base-rates (described above, 70 vs. 30). 
However, they did conclude that conflict detection as a monitoring system does operate at 
some level within T1, even before T2 is engaged. Pennycook and Thompson (2012) further 
argued that a person’s utilization of base-rates is not within the domain of T2, but under the 
purview of T1. Their results showed that use of the base-rates within a problem (when 
participants are asked to respond intuitively) is as effortless as incorporating the stereotypic 
information (which has always been assumed to be a T1 process; see also Pennycook et al., 
2014). In the next section, I describe the framework under which the conflict detection 
mechanism operates, i.e., how the mechanism is proposed to work.  
Conflict Detection and Resolution Mechanism in Dual Process 
An open investigation in the DPTs literature is the operation of the mechanism of 
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conflict detection and subsequent resolution (correct or incorrect). Broadly, conflict arises 
when a solution to a given problem can be answered by an intuition (e.g., a stereotype) or an 
alternative, possibly logic-based response (e.g., probability) and they are different (De Neys, 
2012, 2014a). A person faced with this sort of judgment has an implicit choice to make with 
respect to a decision. The intuitive response could be chosen, reflecting a desire to stick with 
the T1 output. Alternatively, the normative response could be chosen, reflecting an initial, 
salient (correct) response generated by T1 or a T2 output, arrived at by deliberation of the 
conflict. Represented this way, it appears that T2 only enters the equation when T1 has made 
an error. The reason for the error could be due to numerous apparent shortcomings of T1 
processing, such as errant heuristics that do not apply to a given situation, processing that 
was too fast or incomplete to fully address the situation, overconfidence, or that an intuitive 
solution is patently false (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; 
Thompson et al., 2011). Of course, why wouldn’t a person want to recruit consciousness and 
WM into a situation in order to arrive at a correct or, at the very least, thought-out solution? 
This situation is where a well-defined conflict detection system is necessary in new and 
existing theories (Pennycook et al., 2015). 
A central question to the conflict monitoring mechanism is how it works. Researchers 
have postulated various mechanisms that monitor the actions of T1 and T2 thinking and act 
as a switch (De Neys, 2012; Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2011). Recently, Evans (2009) has 
argued for a “Type 3” processing, which is only activated when there is conflict between T1 
and T2. He has called the transitioning between the two main processing types default 
interventionism (Evans, 2007). Evans argues that at any given time, a person is usually 
utilizing automatic processing (T1), and only when there is an instance of conflict, T2 may 
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“intervene”. The watchful sentry or shallow monitor in this model has the sole purpose to 
facilitate the transition from T1 to T2 in case of conflicting response outputs. Figure 1, Panel 
A illustrates the transitioning from T1 thinking (intuitive) and T2 thinking (deliberate), 
conceptualized for these serialized models. Another serial model that is of note is Stanovich’s 
(Stanovich & Toplak, 2012; Stanovich, 2009, 2011) tripartite model. He refers to T1 as 
reflexive processing and T2 as reflective processing, with the detector of conflict as a 
separate algorithmic mind, which handles the T2 processes of cognitive decoupling and serial 
associative processing. However, these serial models have one glaring deficiency: how is 
conflict detected in the first place? If there is a conflict, but T1 is the only process engaged, 
how has T2 detected the conflict, let alone even attempted to resolve it? Recent data does not 
support this model either: If people are spending more time on problems, what is the nature 
of this processing? It cannot be T1 as a heuristic system, and if it is T2, what brought about 
its activation? A serial framework cannot answer these questions. Purely serial models suffer 
from a tautological impasse. 
Another early postulated apparatus for dual processing is a parallel structure (e.g., 
Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996). For example, Sloman’s (1996) model suggests that associative 
processing and rule-based processing operate simultaneously (B, Figure 1), but in the 20 
years since the introduction of that model, evidence shows that this is not the case (De Neys, 
2014a), let alone too cognitively wasteful (since the model argues that rule-based processing 
is the more demanding, effortful processing). This creates a situation whereby both systems 
are always activated, as constant cognitive effort. De Neys and Glumicic (2008) eloquently 
put this inefficiency as a “viola[tion] of the principle of cognitive economy” (p. 1277). 
Moreover, if T2 is always engaged, there is little advantage to a heuristic system being in 
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place (De Neys, 2012). However, the most compelling piece of evidence regarding the 
parallel structure of dual processing is that it would maintain a conflict monitoring system 
operating at near perfect efficiency because conflict between the two processing routes is 
almost always detected (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). Evans (2007) contradicts this 
viewpoint by arguing that in parallel processing models, data fit as well as a model where 
conflict is avoided in the first place. Thus, solely parallel processing seems inadequate to 
explain recent evidence of reasoning task performance.  
Neurophysiological evidence for conflict detection. There is a small body of 
neurophysiological evidence to support the role of a conflict detector in DPTs. Though a 
small focus in the DPTs literature, the evidence converges to a couple of brain regions. The 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is the central brain region that is involved in conflicts of 
information processing (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). More specifically, the literature 
reflects that processing in the ACC’s functioning is a combination of conflict monitoring and 
the triggering of cognitive control to modify subsequent performance. Tasks that involve 
overriding cued or compelling responses are familiar in psychological treatments and aim to 
test the monitoring and control functions of the ACC. These include Stroop tests, flanker 
tasks, the Simon task, global-local tasks, and go/no-go tasks. These tasks all share one central 
idea: the participant must override the overwhelming incorrect choice (e.g., the color of the 
ink of a displayed word, such as the word red in brown ink) for the correct choice (e.g., the 
actual word written, red). The evidence suggests that ACC activation in this way is generally 
associated with response selection; in other words, it is activated after other regions have 
processed the information and a behavioral action must be made (Botvinick et al., 2004).  
Based on this work that shows conflict activates the ACC, De Neys and colleagues 
 15 
 
(De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008) gave participants base-rate neglect problems while in a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner to determine if the ACC activates 
when a person reads problems where the base-rates and the stereotype information are 
incongruent (much like the classic lawyer-engineer problem; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
They did not observe differential activation in the ACC, but did note that the right lateral 
prefrontal cortex (RLPFC) activated on conflict problems. The RLPFC is associated with 
inhibition processing in reasoning (Goel, Buchel, Frith, & Dolan, 2000; Goel & Dolan, 
2003). While the ACC is still argued to be involved, it is possible the base-rate neglect 
paradigm is not sensitive enough for differential activation. Another possibility is that 
differential activation in the ACC reflects conscious awareness of conflict, such as “oh, that 
was a no-go trial, I should not have pressed the button.” More work is needed in the neural 
correlates of conflict detection to make any reasonable conclusion about the ACC’s 
involvement. 
In support of the RLPFC participating in conflict detection and resolution, Stollstorff, 
Vartanian, and Goel (2012) found additional evidence for the RLPFC’s involvement as an 
inhibitory activation on a deductive reasoning task. They found consistent activation of the 
RLPFC under conditions where the conclusion of the syllogistic argument has a belief-logic 
conflict. In addition, when the level of conflict in the entire argument was high (i.e., the 
premises conflicted with belief at varying levels of interference), the RLPFC was engaged, 
and this activation was above and beyond the activation noted for the conclusion only. The 
authors argue that the role of this region is to inhibit competing responses, and in this 
particular case, prior beliefs. Behavioral work by De Neys and Franssens (2009) corroborates 
this inhibition hypothesis through a series of experiments using various reasoning and 
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cognitive tasks. 
Other neurophysiological evidence (De Neys et al., 2010) in the realm of skin 
conductance responses has shown that when people solve classic syllogisms that have 
incongruent information (a belief-logic conflict), an increase in skin conductivity is noted, 
which is argued to be associated with unconscious activation of a conflict detection system. 
An autonomic response of the sympathetic nervous system was observed when individuals 
read a simple syllogism, one in which deduction (validity) suggested one answer (the correct 
one) and prior beliefs suggested the other answer (the wrong one). The autonomic arousal 
under conflict suggests detection is an unconscious effort, related to other neural mechanisms 
of conflict detection. 
It is unclear from these limited studies that conflict detection and resolution is 
primarily the role of the ACC or the RLPFC. Studies that show ACC activations are 
indicative of conflict detection have not been extended to reasoning studies (and dual process 
investigations) with a comprehensive approach. Additionally, the influence of the RLPFC 
has only been shown within belief bias studies and has also not been extended in a 
comprehensive way. If either brain region is to be attributed to DPTs and the conflict 
monitoring mechanism, more work is needed. These investigations will be left to future 
work, as these questions are beyond the current scope of this dissertation. However, 
cognitively, the current work does investigate the need for a greater specification of the 
mechanism itself and the situations under which it operates, which the next two models 
attempt to provide. 
Conflict Detection and Logical Intuitions 
The first model to be described and tested in this dissertation is De Neys’ Logical 
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Intuition Model (LIM; De Neys, 2012, 2014a). The LIM combines the two approaches 
discussed above, serial and parallel processing, into a hybrid model (C, Figure 1; De Neys, 
2012). De Neys has argued the case for logical intuitions, or rather, simple logical processing 
that is automatic, due to the conflict monitoring system working at an efficient level (De 
Neys & Glumicic, 2008). For example, most of the research in conditional reasoning and 
categorical reasoning has shown that reasoners are adept and quick at completing modus 
ponens inferences (e.g., De Neys, 2006). The data from this study suggest that this inference 
is actually a logical intuition and it is such a common occurrence that historically it was 
formalized into a logical rule. According to the model proffered by De Neys, heuristic 
intuitions and logical intuitions operate in parallel (the latter might also be considered 
“shallow” analytic processing; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012) 
within T1 processing, and only if these two streams of intuitive processing are in conflict 
(producing different response outputs) would T2 processing be engaged. This is less 
cognitively demanding than a purely parallel system of T1 and T2 (De Neys, 2012). This is 
perhaps the crucial difference between the LIM and the previous two processing accounts. 
The time of conflict is clearly defined as the moment when the intuitive streams of T1 are at 
odds, reflecting two or more responses. Since T2 is regarded as the analytical processing 
type, it can now analyze the conflict of the two intuitions and proceed from there. However, 
engagement of T2 after the onset of conflict is optional—a person can choose to rely on the 
stronger output of T1 (Thompson et al., 2011). The seriality of T1-T2 is only instantiated in 
times of response conflict; if there is no such conflict, T2 remains inactive. As a result, this 
does not necessarily mean that a correct answer to a judgment or reasoning task would be 
achieved, as previously noted. 
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Conceptually, if there is a distinction of T1 and T2 in the cognitive architecture, then 
a mechanism for detection and resolution of conflict must be an integral part of the system. 
Previous models had failed to capture this important piece, which has engendered skepticism 
(Keren, 2013; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Osman, 2004); the revised LIM described 
above places this mechanism as the integral part of model. 
Conflict Detection and the Three-Stages 
Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler (2015) described a Three-stages Model (TSM) of 
dual process and conflict detection, and this is the most recent model in the conflict detection 
debate (and the second to be specifically addressed/tested in this dissertation). The authors 
argue that the LIM merely describes conflict detection, and by extension, successful 
detection, but fails to describe or delineate differences in T2 processing quality. This latter 
point is the central theme of the TSM model: T2 processing, as an imperfect analytic 
processing system, should have measurable differences in quality depending on the judgment 
or reasoning task. 
The three stages of the model are displayed in Figure 2. The stages have familiar 
undertones to the LIM. The first Stage is purely T1, which generates a response upon an 
initial reading of problem or situation. However, much like the LIM, a person can generate 
multiple initial responses, and these initial responses are not restricted by the model (so they 
could be a heuristic intuition, such as a stereotype, or a logical intuition, such as modus 
ponens). The time to make a decision in Stage 1 is characterized in milliseconds. Stage 2 is 
the conflict monitoring stage: if the problem or situation contains a conflict in outputs, then 
Stage 3 is entered and T2 is engaged. This monitoring process is also characterized in 
milliseconds. If there is no conflict, then Stage 3 is merely the output of the initial response 
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that is most salient. 
In all cases, Stage 3 is T2 engagement and reflects response output (the decision 
made on the task). The authors make two qualitative distinctions in this final stage: 
rationalization or cognitive decoupling. If the initial salient response (let’s say the stereotype 
response of base-rate neglect problem) is ultimately chosen, then the person is said to have 
rationalized: reasons for justification of this response are made (even after successful conflict 
detection), even if it is not the normative response (perhaps an effortful, belief-based 
response; see Handley & Trippas, 2015). Alternatively, successful conflict resolution in this 
model and in this Stage is a process labeled cognitive decoupling. This is thought by some to 
be the defining feature of T2 (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013); the TSM refines this point by 
only ascribing the ability to decouple as successful detection and resolution. This latter point 
is tricky, because the broader definition of cognitive decoupling includes the ability to 
rationalize. Taken together, this stage is reflected by slower responding, with final decisions 
taking seconds of processing, rather than milliseconds in the first two stages. 
Testing the Models 
 The specific goals for testing these two models are two-fold: (1) directly testing the 
model predictions that these two models suggest, which has not been previously attempted, 
and (2) extend the predictions beyond a base-rate neglect paradigm. First, while the TSM was 
developed as a response to the LIM, it did not directly test the hypotheses associated with the 
model. This is a major oversight if a distinction between the two models was desired. 
Second, and more importantly, both models have been developed within the base-rate neglect 
task. While I also utilized this task for my testing, it is essential that these two models be 
subjected to testing within different judgment or reasoning tasks (as outlined by the boundary 
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conditions in De Neys, 2014a, and a position abdicated by Pennycook et al., 2015). 
Therefore, a major part of this dissertation focused on the outcomes of not only the base-rate 
neglect task, but also a conditional reasoning task (Thompson, 1994). These two tasks are 
qualitatively different and are adequate candidates for contrasts for these two models, as well 
as DPTs in general, since the demarcation between probability and representativeness cannot 
be their primary focus. Manipulating logical structure (validity) with believability is an 
essential empirical exercise in DPTs as was described above (e.g., De Neys & Franssens, 
2009; Evans et al., 1983). 
While the authors of the LIM and the TSM might argue that their models are distinct, 
there are more similarities than differences. However, these points can be tested empirically. 
First, the LIM states that people are generally efficient and routine conflict detectors (De 
Neys, 2014a); that is, in instances of conflict, people will at least implicitly recognize that the 
problem’s information cues to multiple initial answers. This can be easily shown by utilizing 
nonconflict problems as a baseline for decision time and then subtracting it from decision 
times of conflict problem errors (Pennycook et al., 2015). This is because nonconflict 
problems have cues that point to the same decision; for example, in a base-rate neglect 
problem, the larger group base-rate and the stereotype description both cue the same answer, 
requiring minimal processing regardless of strategy and essentially no reason for T2 
engagement. Thus, if people are good conflict detectors, then they should have reliable 
positive time differences between nonconflict problems and incorrect conflict problem 
responses, regardless of how often a person chooses the stereotype answer or the base-rate 
answer on conflict problems. The LIM would predict this outcome. In contrast, the TSM 
would predict that poor performers do not have reliable conflict detection, and therefore a 
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positive relationship between performance and response time differences would be observed. 
In either case, both the LIM and TSM suggest that conflict detection is the integral part of the 
model, so these predictions are crucial to describing the cognitive architecture of dual 
processing. 
 An additional prediction that tests both models is the effort of T2. In the LIM, T2 
engagement is optional after conflict is detected (De Neys, 2012), and the only description of 
T2 engagement comes in the form of inhibition of the initial intuitive response. Thus, a 
correct answer on a conflict problem (other than guessing), requires T2 to act as an inhibiting 
agent, which is measured by longer processing times. In the TSM, this is also the case, but a 
distinction is made with decoupling and rationalizing when T2 is engaged. This is because a 
person could spend more decision time on a conflict problem but still get it wrong 
(Pennycook et al., 2015). However, there would be a time difference between rationalizing 
and decoupling, whereby decoupling is ultimately the longest decisions times (and 
necessarily correct answers). In both of these cases, accuracy and response times can test 
these two pieces.  
The broad predictions for these additional T2 postulates are the following: (1) 
Inhibition effects can be described as the response time difference between correct and 
incorrect responses on conflict problems. Inhibition is a function of T2 processing, and so 
this would increase overall decision time between these two responses. A positive 
relationship between accuracy on conflict problems and this response time difference is 
expected, as more base-rate choices should engender longer greater inhibition response time 
differences. This inhibition effect is the hallmark of the LIM. (2) The decoupling effect 
prediction can be described as the response time difference between correct conflict 
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responses from the nonconflict baseline, which represents the progression of successful 
conflict detection to successful conflict resolution. The relationship between accuracy on 
conflict problems and this response time difference should be negative, as participants who 
choose the base-rate less often must decouple in order to arrive at the base-rate answer. This 
response time difference should decrease as base-rates choices increase. This decoupling 
explanation is the hallmark of the TSM. 
Conflict Detection and Resolution Errors: Individual Differences  
If the LIM/TSM is the cognitive framework of dual processing, what is the behavioral 
component that is needed to complete the psychological picture? More specifically, what are 
the individual differences that can be described within and between the LIM and the TSM? 
Behavioral evidence shows that reasoners are not perfect and errors occur, so what about a 
person makes these errors occur? De Neys and Bonnefon (2013) offer three accounts for why 
errors might occur on classic reasoning problems to untangle the occurrence of conflict and 
resolution in DPTs. These process accounts each have different hypothesized behavioral 
outcomes and have a relationship with the neural correlates research described above. These 
accounts broadly incorporate findings from various reasoning tasks, including the findings 
from base-rate neglect and syllogistic reasoning paradigms. These accounts are described in 
detail below. 
Storage failure. First, a reasoner may commit reasoning errors due to storage failure. 
Essentially, a reasoner has failed to store or learn the proper formal reasoning knowledge or 
strategies. In this case, the reasoner would have only the heuristic knowledge of the situation 
(or a similar situation) to guide them through the reasoning process. Therefore, errors cannot 
be attributed to the conflict monitoring system, because there is no prior knowledge of the 
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situation to be in conflict with an intuitive answer (T1 processing). Here the error occurs 
early in the processing of the situation or reasoning problem and further processing (T2) is 
unlikely when the decision is made (De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013). Stanovich (2009) argues 
that a storage failure can describe individual differences data, especially on more difficult 
reasoning tasks. A storage failure behavioral pattern would likely show a high error rate on 
conflict problems, coupled with relatively short response times. This latter measure could 
reflect guessing or the urge to comply with the intuitive answer. The type of failure can be 
used to show that the differences between a biased and an unbiased reasoner diverge early in 
the reasoning process. 
Monitoring failure. Second, a reasoner might be biased or make errors because there 
is a monitoring failure. In this account, a person has the necessary formal knowledge, but is 
unaware that the situation or problem demands this particular knowledge, and so there is a 
transfer disconnection leading to favoring the heuristic answer. This is a failure of detecting 
the conflict of a heuristically-cued answer vs. a formally-cued answer. The TSM and LIM 
diverge on this point: the TSM postulates that conflict detection is an individual difference, 
and the monitoring failure defined by De Neys and Bonnefon (2013) is synonymous with a 
failure to detect conflict (Pennycook et al., 2015). 
This has also been described as a metacognitive monitoring failure (Thompson, 
2009). Thompson and colleagues (Thompson, 2009, 2013; Thompson et al., 2011, 2013; 
Thompson & Morsanyi, 2012) have described the motivating mechanism of conflict 
detection and resolution as a feeling of rightness (FOR). The FOR describes the process by 
which an individual remains in T1 thinking, when all indications of a given problem point to 
engaging T2 thinking. However, a feeling of anything is highly abstract and conceptual. 
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Thompson and colleagues (Thompson et al., 2011) argue that FOR is maintained in a self-
appraisal of confidence in a given response. The experience of confidence is an affective one 
and it is linked to the relative ease by which an answer comes to mind (i.e., fluency). Last, T2 
engagement is wholly dependent on the strength of the FOR response and fluency of 
information processing. If FOR is high and an answer comes easily to mind (such as in a 
base-rate task with a strong stereotype description), then T2 thinking will not likely become 
engaged because there is little monitoring. A response of this type should be quite quick. If 
there is any instance of monitoring, this in and of itself should be time consuming, and with 
decreasing confidence, should increase. Thus, if FOR is low and fluency is equally low, T2 
thinking will likely be engaged in order to deliberate on an answer, increasing processing 
time. To achieve a correct answer with low FOR, even more time is needed than for incorrect 
answer. 
Thompson and colleagues (Thompson, 2009, 2013; Thompson et al., 2011, 2013; 
Thompson & Morsanyi, 2012) have a number of experimental results to support the FOR 
account. In one such study (Thompson et al., 2011), participants answered questions during a 
reasoning task, where each question was followed by a confidence question, which asked the 
participant to choose whether they were guessing or were certain, on a 1-7 Likert scale. Then 
they allowed participants to rethink their original answers and possibly make a change to 
those answers. The researchers found that confidence was negatively associated with the 
decision not to change answer when given an opportunity (keep the initial answer). In other 
words, when FOR was low, participants were more likely to change their answers and spend 
much more time thinking about their answers. Thus, a low FOR signals for T2 engagement 
and the need for analytic thinking. T2 engagement did not necessarily lead to a correct 
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answer, however. 
Inhibition failure. Third, a reasoner might be biased or make errors because there is 
an inhibition failure. A person would have the required formal knowledge for the situation, 
and most of the time, use it. In addition, these people would have the ability to detect and 
monitor any conflicts between formal answers and heuristic answers. However, the use of 
formal knowledge and conflict monitoring are theorized to be implicit processes (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008). Essentially, the conflict monitoring processes occur without conscious 
knowledge (and proceed within milliseconds of processing), but the decision is made on the 
initial response of T1 (likely the more salient cue; Pennycook, Trippas, et al., 2014). The 
failure may arise from a number of factors, such as motivation, cognitive resources, failure of 
deliberation/reflection, or an explicit justification of the why the heuristic solution is correct 
(rationalization). The behavioral pattern seen by this inhibition failure account would show 
errors on the conflict problems, at varying levels depending on individual differences, and 
also shorter response times when compared to correct conflict problems. Correct conflict 
problems would have the longest response times as it reflects the entire conflict monitoring 
and resolution process, where conflict is detected and the prepotent (incorrect) response is 
inhibited (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). 
Recent evidence (De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, 
Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010; De Neys, Rossi, & Houdé, 2013; Pennycook & 
Thompson, 2012; Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson & Morsanyi, 2012) points to the errors 
of the conflict detection mechanism as a result of a monitoring failure or an inhibition failure. 
Incorporation of failures into process models. These failure accounts represent 
broad descriptions of potential biases. However, they do need to be included within a larger 
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dual processing framework. Both the LIM and TSM models suggest similar hypotheses for 
the incorporation of the failures, especially for storage and monitoring failures. There is 
divergence for inhibition failure between the models. 
For storage and monitoring failures, both models agree that conflict would not be 
detected in people who do poorly across judgment and reasoning tasks (bias-susceptible 
reasoners). There would be early time divergence between these people and those who do 
well on judgment and reasoning tasks (bias-resistant reasoners). Bias-susceptibility would 
produce behavioral responses of low accuracy and fast responses vs. higher accuracy and 
slower responding marked by bias-resistance. The measurable distinctions within bias-
susceptible individuals would be accuracy and confidence on conflict problems: storage 
failure would reflect a worse performance than monitoring failure, and perhaps less 
confidence (the trumping measure here, though, is response time, which would be quick). 
For inhibition failures, the two models diverge. First, in both cases, late divergence of 
bias-susceptible reasoners and bias-resistant reasoners occurs: no storage or monitoring 
failures—bias is simply the result of failing to inhibit. However, the models differ on how 
this individual difference account and time divergence is described. The LIM claims that 
inhibition failures are the main reason for errors and the main distinction between sets of 
people on the base-rate neglect task (De Neys, 2012, 2014a; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), 
and recent evidence supports this claim. More importantly, it suggests that conflict detection 
is usually successful, but in order for a person to be accurate on a given conflict problem, T2 
must act as an inhibitor of the salient, compelling (heuristic) initial response. The TSM 
suggests that successful resolution of a conflict problem is not necessarily inhibition, but T2 
engagement and deliberation brought about by cognitive decoupling (Pennycook et al., 
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2015). Unsuccessful resolution is the result of T2 engagement, but instead of decoupling, the 
reasoner rationalizes the initial, compelling response. Clearly, the LIM makes a distinction 
between T2 engagement: a correct answer on a conflict problem represents T2 (inhibition); 
an incorrect answer reflects T1 output. The TSM contrasts this view by stating both outputs 
(correct and incorrect) are the result of T2 and response times should reflect this—one is 
inhibition (decoupling) and the other not (rationalization).  
Are these consequential biases? The final piece for these cognitive failures is if they 
are consequential to decision-making. Do these failures represent a cognitive framework that 
is poorly adapted to modern problem-solving (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977)? If these biases 
are troublesome, an education focus should be adopted that can indicate when biases can 
occur on these types of tasks; offering training or feedback might improve performance and 
aid efforts to reduce biases in general.  
In a new line of research, De Neys (2014b) investigated the role of feedback on 
whether performance on a reasoning task was a monitoring failure or if it is due to an 
inhibition failure. He compared groups that either got feedback or got no feedback, and found 
that the typical measures of T2 engagement (accuracy and RT) were modulated by the 
presence of feedback. Participants benefited by receiving feedback and this was most 
important on conflict problems. He argued that this was evidence for an inhibition failure 
account, because participants had already detected the conflict, and the feedback only 
signaled them to their errors, allowing them to inhibit the prepotent response. 
Using a similar feedback manipulation within the tasks the final goal of this 
dissertation was to mitigate the described cognitive failures. If these failure accounts were 
based on individual differences, would giving manipulating feedback interact with their 
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effects? In other words, if a person who tends to make monitoring errors is told that they are 
doing poorly, regardless of their actual performance, will their confidence decrease and 
signal Type 2 engagement, effectively extinguishing conflict monitoring errors? If a person is 
told they’re doing well, would the interaction be minimal, indicating errors based on 
monitoring failures? These are central questions to the roles of confidence, fluency, response 
time, and failure divergence (early vs. late) and address whether failures such as monitoring 
can be extinguished by merely reducing participants’ confidence. This would ultimately 
reflect the modal nature (De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013) of the failures, as well as support the 
process models of LIM/TSM (De Neys, 2012, 2014a; Pennycook et al., 2015). 
Thinking dispositions and cognitive ability. A related individual differences 
investigation in DPTs has centered on thinking dispositions and cognitive ability. Thinking 
dispositions (or thinking styles) are the motivational component toward utilizing T1 or T2 in 
domain general or domain specific ways (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 
2014; Pennycook et al., 2015; Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2015; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). In 
other words, how willing is a person to engage in effortful processing in a given context or 
situation? Research has shown that a person’s motivation for complex cognitive activities is 
associated with the ability to inhibit intuitive responses (Swan & Revlin, 2015) on the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005); moreover, a person’s cognitive flexibility 
or rigidity (Stanovich & West, 1997) has a pronounced relationship with performance on the 
base-rate neglect task, among other reasoning tasks and investigations (Pennycook, Cheyne, 
et al., 2014; Pennycook et al., 2015; Swan & Revlin, 2015; Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2015; 
Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). Relatedly, the ability of a person to engage in this type of 
processing is important (Stanovich & West, 2000). However, the dispositional quality of an 
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individual trumps their cognitive ability—it’s not really a question of can, but want. Is a 
person intrinsically motivated to engage T2 on a given reasoning or judgment problem? The 
crucial part of this question is that it separates the engagement of T2 and a possible 
normative answer from the initial outputs of T1 (conflict monitoring or initial 
heuristic/logical intuitions). Utilizing these measures to compliment the investigation of 
individual differences is fruitful to further identify the biases that occur on various reasoning 
tasks and how this relates to performance on those tasks. 
Present Series of Experiments 
The current processing models (LIM and TSM) and failure hypotheses describe 
certain patterns of behavior, and there is still a debate on the efficiency of conflict detection 
and the quality of T2 engagement. For example, are errors the result of conflict detection 
errors (monitoring) or conflict resolution errors (inhibition, decoupling, or rationalization)? 
The evaluation of the two models will carry through the following set of three related 
experiments. The first experiment will utilize the base-rate neglect task to test the model 
predictions of the LIM and the TSM. Participants will be shown 50 base-rate problems, with 
half of them containing conflicting base-rate and stereotype diagnostic information. The 
second experiment will expand the investigation from base-rate neglect to conditional 
reasoning problems (e.g., Thompson, 1994; Thompson et al., 2011), which is a qualitatively 
different task than base-rate neglect (for a comprehensive review see Thompson, 1994). The 
addition of conditional reasoning allows for a contrast of logic principles and believability. A 
comparison of conflict detection/monitoring and metacognitive monitoring will be a central 
piece of this experiment across both tasks. The third experiment will incorporate a feedback 
manipulation into the two tasks, designed to either increase reliance on T1 outputs (high 
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performance feedback) or instigate T2 engagement (low performance feedback). An 
additional analysis goal of the present studies is the description of group effects, but more 
importantly, contributing to the individual differences part of this debate. 
A number of research questions will be addressed in the present thesis: 
Research question 1. Do the data support the LIM framework that states that the 
conflict detection mechanism is a T1 process or that it is a T2 process, as suggested by the 
TSM? 
Research question 2. Do accuracy, response time, and confidence measures indicate 
the type of failure with either processing model? 
Research question 3. There is converging evidence from two research groups (De 
Neys, 2012; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Cheyne, et al., 2014; Pennycook et al., 
2012; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Pennycook, Trippas, et al., 2014; Thompson et al., 
2011, 2013) regarding base-rate neglect problems and the issues of conflict detection and 
resolution. However, each of these discussions has viewed the mechanism at the group-level, 
with minimal discussion of individual differences, and little attention paid to individual-level 
processing (Pennycook et al., 2015). As such, there is an open question with respect to how 
often a person experiences conflict detection and modifies their behavior to resolve the 
conflict (or not). Two related research questions stem from this ID focus: 
(3a) Using the failure hypotheses (De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013), can 
participants be reliably grouped by their performance? In other words, are 
certain patterns of behaviors indicative of storage failures, monitoring failures, 
or inhibition failures? 
(3b) With a large number of trials for a base-rate neglect task or a conditional 
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reasoning task, performance over time can be assessed. Is it an ongoing 
mechanism, or after a certain number of experiences with the same type of 
reasoning problem will a person begin to modify their initial behavior? In 
other words, is engagement of T2 thinking fleeting for a single problem, or 
does the conscious activation of T2 thinking engender learning to prevent 
similar conflicts from T1 thinking? Broadly, are people learning on this task 
(the learning hypothesis)? 
Research question 4.  What is the nature of FOR in T2 engagement (Thompson et 
al., 2011)? Findings in support of the FOR argument would indicate that the conflict 
detection system errors are a result of a monitoring failure. 
Research question 5. Is performance on the base-rate neglect task indicative of 
domain general tendencies that will transfer to a conditional reasoning task? 
Research question 6. There is little research on the role of feedback in dual process 
reasoning. Can providing feedback promote learning on the task and interact with erroneous 
responding (increase or decrease)? 
Additional questions. Additional research questions were investigated after 
discussion of the impact of the above research questions. 
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Chapter II. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was conducted to test the behavioral predictions inherent in the LIM 
(De Neys, 2012) and the TSM (Pennycook et al., 2015) dual processing models.  
Both models claim that conflict detection is a fast, T1 process, but the LIM postulates 
that people do it efficiently and routinely, and it is a universal trait; the TSM states that the 
conflict detection system is error-prone (i.e., prone to monitoring failures). Thompson and 
others (e.g., Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Pennycook, Trippas, et al., 2014; Thompson et 
al., 2011) have found evidence that suggests base-rates are processed within T1 and that 
conflict is detected within T1, not a stand-alone process between T1 and T2 (as would be 
suggested by a serial or default interventionist accounts), supporting both models’ claims that 
conflict is borne out of conflicting T1 outputs. RTs coupled with accuracy (i.e., choosing the 
base-rate answer for either problem type) are crucial to describing the conflict detection and 
monitoring claims of the two models. It is only the engagement and the quality of T2 that is 
different between the two models, and RTs in this stage will indicate which model describes 
the data better. 
The LIM claims that T2 engagement inhibits the intuitive response (De Neys, 2012, 
2014a, 2014b; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Handley & Trippas, 2015) and that the RT 
difference between correct and incorrect answers on conflict base-rate problems reflects this 
inhibitory processing. The TSM makes a distinction with correct answers on conflict 
problems: the longest RTs reflect cognitive decoupling, which has similar qualities to 
inhibition (Pennycook et al., 2015), but this is reflected by the RT difference between 
nonconflict responses and correct conflict responses. Cognitive decoupling responses should 
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take longer than incorrect conflict responses, but only if conflict is detected (i.e., no 
monitoring failure). According to the TSM, this latter process is described as rationalization. 
Something about the stereotype is just too compelling to ignore. Thus, the TSM postulates 
that conflict detection would show a positive relationship between RT and conflict problem 
accuracy. However, participants with higher accuracy will spend less time decoupling than 
participants with lower accuracy, indicating a negative relationship between processing times 
in T2 and base-rates responses for more bias-resistant reasoners. This ultimately supports the 
concept that base-rates are processed in T1 as both models suggest and biased-resistant 
people can ultimately utilize this information better than bias-susceptible people (De Neys, 
2012; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook et al., 2015). 
In the case of the conflict monitoring/detection claims of the two models, as well as 
the cognitive decoupling claim of the TSM, nonconflict RTs are used as a baseline measure 
to create RT difference scores. The reason RTs on nonconflict problems represent a baseline 
is because the problems generally have one answer cued by both the base-rates and the 
stereotypic information in the problem. Historically, accuracy is generally at a ceiling (with 
some variation if the problem contains less salient or misinterpreted stereotypes; Pennycook 
et al., 2015). Since a single answer is cued by both sources of information in the problems, 
then RTs are assumed to be extremely quick beyond an initial reading, acting as starting 
point for measuring additional processing that is hypothesized to reflect conflict detection 
and T2 engagement. 
These two models identify individual differences regarding the sources of errors on 
this task: storage and monitoring failures, which are likely to occur during T1 processing, 
before the moment of conflict detection (De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013). These sources of 
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errors would result in poor accuracy on the task, as well as very little RT difference between 
nonconflict and conflict responses in general. Thus, as they are defined, errors are apparent 
before any observable T2 engagement. The remaining source of errors, inhibition failure, 
occurs after conflict is detected; any proper resolution would require T2 to act as an 
inhibitory agent. If the data support storage or monitoring failures, then bias-resistant and 
bias-susceptible people should diverge rather early in their processing. A person can either 
detect a conflict or not on a given problem, and additional processing would be required 
beyond the detection (TSM). In contrast, if the data support inhibition as defined here (LIM), 
then everyone detects conflicts, and the difference between bias-susceptible and bias-
resistant people is the ability to inhibit (giving more processing power to T2. This experiment 
specifically tests these hypotheses, at both the group level and the individual level by 
measuring RT differences and comparing them across accuracy on conflict problems. 
Furthermore, individual differences can also be described by thinking dispositions 
and cognitive ability (Frederick, 2005; Pennycook, Cheyne, et al., 2014; Pennycook, Trippas, 
et al., 2014; Stanovich & West, 2000; Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2015; Swan & Revlin, 2015). 
This experiment utilized some of the common indices of these two individual differences 
measures, including the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), the Need for 
Cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale 
(Stanovich & West, 1997), and SAT scores (Stanovich & West, 2000). Correlations between 
dispositions toward a desire for engaging in complex cognitive activities (Need for 
Cognition) and a stronger cognitive flexibility (Actively Open-minded Thinking) are 
expected to be positive. In accordance with the inhibition failure source of errors, the CRT 
should be positively correlated with conflict problem accuracy, which suggests that the two 
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measures both describe a person’s ability to inhibit an intuitive, but ultimately incorrect, 
response. Finally, SAT scores should be positively correlated with conflict problem 
performance; previous research has shown that SAT scores have been linked to T2 
processing and independent of T1 processing (nonconflict problem accuracy; Evans, 2013).  
Last, this experiment tested for a learning effect (Mevel et al., 2015). It modified the 
conventional base-rate neglect task by adding many more problems in order to track progress 
over time. Base-rate neglect has been studied extensively in the last decade in the conflict 
detection realm of DPT. However, the methodology rarely has participants complete more 
than 20 base-rate problems (in total). While there have been extensive-trial studies in base-
rate neglect (e.g., De Neys et al., 2008; De Neys et al., 2010; Pennycook et al., 2015), none 
have discussed participants’ progress over time. This approach is novel and may illuminate 
how reasoners react to multiple problems over time. This methodology additionally tested the 
viability of introducing feedback in an extensive-trial task. 
In the current experiment, the Research Questions 1, 2, and 3 were addressed. The 
predictions for this experiment were as follows: 
Predictions  
Behavioral predictions. (1) Performance of participants on conflict problems will be 
less accurate than performance on nonconflict problems, when setting the “accurate” answer 
as the base-rate choice on each problem. (2a) Conflict detection hypothesis: If there is a 
conflict detection process that people use, then incorrect responses on conflict problems will 
be slower than on nonconflict problems, overall, indicating general conflict detection and 
support for both the LIM and the TSM. (2b) If LIM is supported, there would be a flat 
relationship between conflict problem accuracy and RT differences (conflict detection index: 
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incorrect, conflict RT – overall nonconflict RT), suggesting all participants recognize conflict 
(efficient and routine—ruling out storage and monitoring failures). (2c) If the TSM is 
supported, this relationship would be positive, suggesting that poor performers do not detect 
conflict as easily as stronger performers (storage and monitoring failures are viable). (3) 
Inhibition failure hypothesis: correct, conflict problem RTs will be slower than incorrect 
conflict problem RTs, supporting the LIM; this relationship can also be expressed as a 
positive relationship between difference RTs for each participant and conflict problem 
accuracy. (4) Cognitive decoupling hypothesis: the RT difference between correct responses 
on conflict problems and overall nonconflict responses is negatively correlated with conflict 
problem accuracy, supporting the TSM. This indicates that participants spend more time 
decoupling on correct answers when those answers are fewer, while participants will spend 
less time overall generating the base-rate answers when they do it more frequently on the set 
of conflict problems. Table 3 contains a condensed version of LIM/TSM index predictions 
(Predictions 2b – 4). 
Individual differences predictions. Bias-susceptible vs. bias-resistant individuals 
will be compared to determine the extent of the above behavioral predictions using analysis 
methods employed in previous literature (De Neys, 2012; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De 
Neys et al., 2010). Correspondingly, bias-resistant and bias-susceptible individuals can be 
classified based on behavioral patterns on the task. 
Additionally, time series regressions will show the progression of performance across 
trials. Based on previous work (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), the hypothesis is that 
participants interpret each problem at a time (order is completely randomized) and there will 
be no appreciable or reliable practice or learning effects. 
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Method 
Participants. Ninety-three psychology undergraduate students (71% female), with a 
Mage = 18.85 years (SD = 1.44), participated in this study for partial course credit. 
Design and materials. All tasks and measures used in the Experiment and 
subsequent experiments are detailed in the Appendices. 
Base-rate task. The materials used for this study were adapted from De Neys et al., 
(2008). See Appendix A for the full list. A typical problem appeared like this: 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 5 men and 995 
women. Jo is a randomly chosen participant of this study. 
 
Jo is 23 years old and is finishing a degree in engineering. On Friday nights, Jo likes 
to go out cruising with friends while listening to loud music and drinking beer. 
 
What is most likely? 
a. Jo is a man 
b. Jo is a woman 
 
This is an example of a conflict problem (base-rate information and diagnostic 
information are incongruent). The other type of problem that participants answered was 
nonconflict problems, where the base-rate information and diagnostic information about the 
randomly selected individual were congruent with one another (swap the numbers for men 
and women in the above problem). Participants answered 50 total base-rate problems, with 
25 conflict problems and 25 nonconflict problems. The neutral condition from De Neys and 
Glumicic (2008) was not included to maximize the contrast in problems type (neutral 
problems do not offer stereotypic information). See De Neys and Glumicic for pretesting 
information regarding strength of stereotype for the problems tested. Stereotypes used varied 
in content: age, gender, race, job-related groups, and stereotypical human characteristics. 
In addition to the congruency of the base-rate information and the diagnostic 
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information, there were three expressions of extreme base-rates (997 to 3, 996 to 4, and 995 
to 5). This was done to vary the presentation of the problems, as well as to force reading of 
the base-rate information (it could be argued that if this information was the same, it would 
be ignored).1 Previous research using this methodology has shown that the extreme base-
rates are needed for contrast between the conflict and nonconflict problems (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook et al., 2012) vs. the traditional 70/30 split used in Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974). 
The task began with an overview of the fake survey that participants believed was the 
basis for the task. For each problem, they were told that a random sample of 1,000 
respondents from the survey was selected. Below is the overview: 
In this stage, you will encounter 50 problems regarding a recent comprehensive 
survey that was conducted in the country. Various pieces of information were 
gathered from thousands of individuals. Each problem will have a random subset of 
1,000 responses.  
For each problem, you will be given a brief description of a randomly selected 
individual from the subset. Based on the information provided, it is your task to 
decide to which group the individual belongs.  
 
Individual difference measures. In addition to the main base-rate decision-making 
task, participants completed three individual differences measures in order to get a more 
complete picture about the decisions that are made on the conflict and nonconflict problems. 
Cognitive Reflection Test. The CRT is a behavioral measure that tests a person’s 
ability to inhibit an intuitive response on a word problem (Frederick, 2005). Consider the 
problem below: 
A bat and a ball together cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
                                                
1 De Neys and Glumicic (2008) performed pretesting on the extreme base-rate values to 
counter this argument and to vary the numbers in order to draw attention to differences 
between problems. Post-hoc analysis in their study showed that the small variation did not 
change performance. 
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much does the ball cost? 
 
The intuitive answer that is cued in the wording of the problem would be 10 cents, 
but this answer would be incorrect due to the “more than” phrasing. The correct answer, 
upon further reflection, would guide the participant to the correct answer of five cents. There 
are two additional word problems in the Test that have careful phrasing to elicit an intuitive 
answer that a person would have to inhibit in order to arrive at the correct answer. Using this 
behavioral method allowed for an objective observation of cognitive reflectivity not achieved 
by some subjective measures. See Appendix B for the entire problem set. 
Thinking disposition questionnaires. Participants were also given two thinking 
disposition questionnaires. These consisted of 18 items from the Need for Cognition scale 
(NFC; Cacioppo et al., 1984) and 41 items from the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale 
(AOT; Stanovich & West, 1997). The NFC asked questions to gauge the propensity of the 
participant to engage in effortful thinking (T2), such as “I prefer complex to simple 
problems.” Participants rated their agreement with the statements on a five-point Likert scale, 
where larger values represented a characteristic quality of the individual and smaller values 
represented an uncharacteristic quality of the individual. The AOT was a composite 
questionnaire that gauged the cognitive flexibility of an individual. In other words, it 
measures how willing someone is to engage in effortful processing that has the potential to 
modify existing beliefs or evaluations. An example of a question from the questionnaire: 
“Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than through 
waiting for good fortune.” Participants rated their agreement on a six-point Likert scale, 
where larger values represented stronger agreement with the statement and smaller values 
represented stronger disagreement with the statement. Each scale had negatively-worded 
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statements that were then reverse-coded (to prevent response acquiescence). Summing the 
individual item scores created composite scores for each participant. Greater composite 
scores reflect a greater propensity to engage in effortful thinking and more flexible thinking. 
Appendix C includes the set of items for the NFC scale and Appendix D includes the set of 
items for the AOT scale. 
Cognitive ability. In addition to thinking dispositions, which reflect cognitive style 
(Pennycook, Cheyne, et al., 2014; Pennycook, Trippas, et al., 2014; Stanovich, 2009), a 
cognitive ability measure used frequently in the cognitive literature (e.g., Stanovich & West, 
2000) was gathered from participants, who provided their most recent SAT score. The 
majority of the undergraduates who participated in the study were from the western United 
States, so this was the likely standardized test taken prior to coming to college. 
Procedure. Participants completed each of the measures at a computer station. Each 
student was introduced to the study and told that there were four stages to the entire session. 
Participants first solved the three problems of the CRT. After this, they answered the 50 
base-rate problems. The order of these problems was fully randomized. Additionally, the 
answer was randomized, and it was either presented as the first option or second option 
(approximately 50% of the problems for each choice and for each problem type). Once the 
participant finished with those problems, they were given an opportunity to rest. After the 
short rest period, instructions for the NFC appeared, describing the questionnaire and each of 
the corresponding scale values. The question order was randomized, and the scale appeared 
below each question. Upon completion of the NFC, the AOT was presented. Instructions and 
description of the scale preceded the questions. Question order was randomized and the scale 
appeared below each question. Finally, participants entered their most recent SAT score (out 
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of 2400) and some demographic information. Participants were debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed. 
Results 
Main behavioral analyses. Behavioral analyses were conducted to test the four main 
predictions. The outcome of each prediction occurs in order, with supporting statistical 
information. In all analyses described below, if a participant did not contribute a value to all 
cells associated with the specific statistical test, the participant was excluded. Specific 
exclusions are noted for the corresponding tests. 
 Prediction (1) stated that nonconflict problems would garner much higher accuracy 
(defined as choosing the base-rate answer on all problems) than accuracy on conflict 
problems. This prediction was supported: as shown in Table 4, participants chose the 
accurate answer on nonconflict problems more often than on the conflict problems, t(92) = 
15.47, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.47. The variance was small in this set of 25 nonconflict 
problems; three problems could be considered outliers for accuracy values below 2.5 SDs.2 
The distribution of problem means for conflict problems was larger, but no problems fell 
outside of the outlier range. For many of the conflict problems, the stereotype decision was 
made significantly more often than chance performance (typically low accuracy). 
The conflict detection hypothesis stated that there would be an increase in RTs for 
incorrect conflict responses above a baseline nonconflict RT. This simple increase marks the 
presence of overall conflict detection within the group. Prediction (2a) was supported. As 
Table 3 reveals, participants took significantly longer to answer conflict problems incorrectly 
                                                
2 All analyses were conducted without these 3 problems, but no meaningful changes to 
accuracy were observed. 
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than nonconflict problems overall, t(84) = 5.44, p < .001, d = .62.3 However, this overall 
difference needs further explanation by incorporating accuracy. Prediction (2b) tests the 
specific tenet within the LIM that conflict detection is efficient, routine, and ubiquitous.  
In contrast, the converse piece of the TSM is also tested, which suggests that 
participants with numerous stereotype responses on conflict problems are less likely to show 
conflict detection within their responses (Prediction (2c)). Specifically, RT differences were 
computed. For each participant, overall average RT on nonconflict problems was subtracted 
from RT on incorrect conflict responses. This RT difference value is the conflict detection 
index. Figure 3 illustrates this index along with the other two indices described below. There 
was a large, positive correlation between conflict performance and the conflict detection 
index, r(83) = .70, p < .001, R2 = .48, indicating that as accuracy on the conflict problems 
increases, so does the difference between incorrect responses on those same conflict 
problems and nonconflict RT. In other words, people who performed better on the conflict 
problems had greater RT differences than people who didn’t perform well on conflict 
problems. Moreover, there was a large negative intercept (b = -2.36 s, t(84) = -3.54, p 
< .001). This outcome reflects support for the TSM (2c) and not the LIM (2b). Some 
individuals clearly did not express conflict detection within their RTs and it is clearly not 
routine in all individuals. However, overall, conflict detection does occur, which is at least a 
corroborating finding for both models. 
Prediction (3) tested the inhibition failure hypothesis, which is a combination of one 
of the failure hypotheses and the role of T2 engagement. For the LIM, T2 engagement is 
                                                
3 Eight participants were excluded from this analysis for not contributing any incorrect 
conflict responses. 
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reflected in longer RTs on correct vs. incorrect responses on conflict problems, which is 
inferred to represent an inhibition function. For the TSM, inhibition is not necessarily the 
explanation for correct answers on conflict problems. 
Two analyses were conducted to test inhibition failure. First, a paired-samples t-test 
showed that when correct judgments on conflict problems were compared with incorrect 
judgments, correct judgments had the same overall RT as incorrect judgments, and this 
difference was not significant (t(84) = .28, p = .78, one-tailed).4 From these data, it is 
difficult to claim support for the LIM and inhibition, as this relationship was not significant, 
which is contrary to recent support (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). This difference could 
be attributed to the more bias-resistant participants making much quicker base-rate responses 
as accuracy increased. 
Second, an additional index was computed. The inhibition index was computed by 
subtracting incorrect conflict RTs (stereotype) from correct RTs (base-rate). Positive values 
on this index indicate longer processing to make the correct decision vs. an incorrect 
decision, which in turn should have a positive relationship with accuracy. Again, in tandem 
with the t-test above, the LIM prediction was not supported by the data; the inhibition index 
and conflict problem performance were negatively correlated, r(83) = -.61, p < .001, R2 
= .38. The intercept was also significantly greater than zero (b = 2.83 s, t(84) = 4.55, p 
< .001), which essentially means that a participant who gets only one conflict problem 
correct would spend longer than two seconds making that correct response vs. the average 
time spent processing the incorrect responses. Figure 3 also illustrates the RT difference 
                                                
4 The same eight participants as the previous test were excluded from this analysis for not 
contributing any incorrect conflict responses. 
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patterns for the inhibition index, with the regression line clearly showing a negative trend. 
Finally, the last behavioral prediction of cognitive decoupling was tested (4). The 
cognitive decoupling index was computed by subtracting overall nonconflict RTs from 
correct conflict RTs. Positive values reflect greater time processing the correct answer on a 
conflict problem vs. when information-cues in the problem are congruent (nonconflict 
problems). This reflection is cognitive decoupling, especially indicative on poor performers 
who give a periodic correct answer (less than chance). The relationship between this index 
and conflict problem accuracy should be negative to support the TSM model prediction. 
However, the prediction was not supported: the cognitive decoupling index had a moderate 
positive correlation with conflict problem accuracy, r(85) = .35, p = .001, R2 = .12. The 
intercept was not significantly greater than zero (b = 467 ms, t(84) = 1.06, p = .29). See 
Figure 3 for the pattern of responses on this index. 
Individual differences analyses. Table 5 shows the correlations of performance on 
each problem type with the individual difference measures (CRT accuracy and NFC & AOT 
scale scores) and cognitive ability (SAT scores). There is a significant positive correlation of 
performance on the CRT with conflict problems only, indicating that people who did well on 
the CRT tended to do well on conflict problems (chose the base-rates more often). 
Additionally, performance on the CRT was positively related to a high Need for Cognition 
and cognitive flexibility (as measured by the AOT). Cognitive ability, as measured by self-
reported SAT scores, was not associated with performance on the base-rate neglect task 
problems. A recent multiple mediation analysis (Swan & Revlin, 2015) was performed to test 
the relationship between behavioral inhibition (from the CRT) and how thinking disposition 
mediates onto a different task: conflict base-rate neglect problems. The analysis revealed that 
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although performance on the CRT was related to both the NFC and AOT, only the AOT was 
responsible for mediated performance on the conflict problems. The authors concluded that 
this inhibitive feature of dual process thinking is more related to the ability to be cognitively 
flexible and less related to domain-general motivational desires for higher cognitive 
activities. In this experiment, the results showed that answers on the CRT, a test that 
represents the ability (or inability) to inhibit an intuitive response, have a stronger positive 
relationship with performance on the base-rate neglect task better than general cognitive 
ability. 
A recent Event Related Potential (ERP; De Neys et al., 2010) study investigated the 
electrical activity of bias-susceptible vs. bias-resistant reasoners on a dual process reasoning 
task. The authors found that the executive monitoring and inhibition functions were different 
for bias-susceptible reasoners (those who performed the “worst” on the task) when compared 
to bias-resistant reasoners (those who performed the “best” on the task). This study, among 
others, was the impetus to determine behavioral differences between participants who did 
well on the base-rate neglect task vs. those who did not do well. More specifically, with 
respect to the Predictions 2 – 4, is there a difference in RT between these two types of 
reasoners? In what ways can the data classify and identify the participants based on their 
responses? 
To test the classification/ID hypotheses regarding performance, a median split was 
performed (Mdn = .40) on total conflict accuracy performance to answer these two questions 
and subjects were divided into bias-susceptible participants (n = 44) and bias-resistant 
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participants (n = 23).5 A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted to determine the extent of 
responses across problem types on RT by the two split groups. Table 6 contains the means 
and standard deviations for this test. Overall, there was a three-way interaction, F(1, 65) = 
4.82, p = .03, η2p = .07. This suggested that the response patterns for the two groups were 
actually different, and it prompted further examination of the within-subjects effects. For 
bias-susceptible participants, a possible inhibition failure effect was observed (two-way 
interaction, F(1, 43) = 30.38, p < .001, η2p = .41): correct responses on conflict problems 
took significantly longer than incorrect responses, t(46) = 4.09, p < .001, d = .54. This is 
reversed for nonconflict problems, where incorrect responses are significantly slower than 
correct responses, t(43) = 3.13, p = .003, d = .50. For bias-resistant participants, there was no 
interaction between problem type and response (F(1, 22) = .94, p = .34): incorrect responses 
yielded slower RTs than correct responses, especially on conflict problems, t(37) = 2.99, p 
= .005, d = .56. The pattern was the same on nonconflict problems, t(24) = 3.75, p = .001. 
Bias-resistant participants are significantly slower when they choose a stereotype answer on 
either problem type (approximately three seconds slower on both).  
A confirmatory discriminant analysis was performed to test the predictive power of 
the median split based on participants’ accuracy performance on (a) both problem types, (b) 
RTs associated with correct and incorrect responses on both problem types, and (c) their 
CRT, NFC, and AOT scores. The 71 cases reported above were analyzed. A single 
discriminant function was calculated. The value of this function was significantly different 
for bias-susceptible and bias-resistant individuals (χ2 = 86.90, df = 9, p < .001). The 
                                                
5 Twenty-six participants were excluded from this analysis due to having no incorrect 
nonconflict problem judgments. Many of these participants had above-median accuracy. 
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correlations between the predictor variables and the discriminant function suggested that 
performance on conflict problems was the best predictor of bias (not surprisingly) on the 
task, followed by RT on these problems when the response was incorrect (stereotype). As 
expected, accuracy on conflict problems was positively correlated with the median-split 
groups, as higher values in the discriminant function would predict a bias-resistant 
individual; additionally, incorrect RTs on conflict problems had a similar positive correlation 
with the median-split groups, suggesting that bias-resistant individuals were more likely to 
spend more time on these problems. As evidenced by the correlations described above, the 
CRT, the NFC, and the AOT did not contribute to the discriminant function, suggesting that 
the bias classification is not located in thinking dispositions or cognitive style. Overall, the 
discriminant function successfully predicted the outcome for 98.5% of all cases, with 
accurate predictions made for 97.7% for the bias-susceptible group and 100% for the bias-
resistant group (only one participant in the bias-susceptible group was predicted to be bias-
resistant based on predictor variables). 
Time series analyses. Figure 4 illustrates the average progression through all 50 
trials for the participants. Overall, it appears that very little learning across trials is occurring, 
for either problem type. To wit, only nonconflict problems show a slight improvement across 
time (R2 = .10, p = .03), whereas there was no improvement across time for conflict problems 
(R2 = .05, p = .13). Furthermore, it appears that participants approached these problems 
individually without a sense that there was a pattern (likely due to the randomization), and 
even though the nonconflict trend over time was significant, the comparison of trends was 
not (Fisher’s z = .50, p = .61).  
The trial averages for each problem type were separated by the two groups described 
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above (bias-susceptible vs. bias-resistant). On conflict problems, there are two patterns to 
highlight: for bias-susceptible participants, they appeared to perform worse over time (R2 
= .09, p = .03); for bias-resistant reasoners, they appeared to get better over time (R2 = .19, p 
= .001). 
Discussion 
 The overall results of Experiment 1 indicate mixed support for the general predictions 
proffered by the LIM and TSM models of conflict detection and resolution. Behaviorally, 
most participants fell into the same trap set by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), utilizing the 
representativeness heuristic, mentioned earlier in the Introduction, to decide group 
membership rather than utilizing the basic base-rates of the problem. Notably this was more 
likely the case when the stereotypes and base-rates were incongruent. The general findings 
also support the idea that conflict detection is an essential part of the judgment process. 
Incorrect conflict judgments took longer than nonconflict judgments in general; this 
difference is a representation of internal, and likely implicit, conflict detection—but this is 
not the case for all participants (as shown in Figure 3). This finding provides support for the 
TSM, which states that conflict is imperfect and not universal (Pennycook et al., 2015), 
counter to De Neys’ LIM (De Neys, 2012, 2014a).  
With respect to the other behavioral RT-related hypotheses, support was mixed for 
inhibition (LIM) and decoupling (TSM). Overall group analyses pointed to inhibition: correct 
conflict judgments trended toward a longer RT, which would reflect an overall engagement 
of T2 to override the prepotent response of the stereotype. However, individual-level 
regressions showed that this relationship was negative, not positive, as individual accuracy 
increased, suggesting that the bias-susceptible individuals were quicker on correct judgments. 
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The bias-susceptible group showed that inhibition was a factor in correct responses. Bias-
resistant participants did not reflect successful inhibition. Taken together, there was mixed 
support for the LIM based on group or individual analysis. Similarly, the cognitive 
decoupling hypothesis (TSM) was shaky: the direction of the relationship with correct 
conflict RT and nonconflict RT was opposite to predicted. It suggests that, again, the bias-
resistant individuals spent more time decoupling rather than the bias-susceptible individuals. 
Overall, the behavioral findings suggest that T2 engagement occurred most often in the bias-
resistant individuals. Finer-tuned ID analyses showed similar patterns.  
 The classification of individuals as bias-susceptible or bias-resistant was an attempt to 
classify individuals into multiple categories on all kinds of reasoning and judgment tasks. 
The pattern presented by the grouping of performance is an intriguing one. Bias-susceptible 
participants somewhat fit the hypothesized conflict detection and resolution behavioral 
pattern described by the TSM (Pennycook et al., 2015). When conflict is detected, it 
increases RT. The amount of added time is relatively small when compared to the amount of 
detection time given by bias-resistant participants, however. Moreover, in order for bias-
susceptible participants to get the answer correct (which, on average, is not often), T2 is 
recruited, which performs the inhibition processing, leading to a base-rate answer (r(45) 
= .24, p = .05, one-tailed). This relationship is contrary to the finding that reflects the entire 
set of participants. It is additional evidence that bias-susceptible reasoners operate much 
differently than those who are relatively bias-resistant. Bias-resistant participants do not 
show this pattern of response or processing. They do show evidence of conflict detection, but 
do not show evidence of inhibition, since they tend to spend more time on problems that are 
ultimately stereotype. This finding is curious; is T2 recruited for rationalization, and not 
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decoupling? The overall findings promote this idea, since choosing the stereotype on any of 
these base-rate neglect problems would require rationalization for the incorrect choice and 
likely reflect deliberation and vacillation that operates against a defined base-rate strategy on 
these problems. As this is only one sample, subsequent experiments herein further 
investigated these results, with the opportunity to compare individuals across two types of 
reasoning/judgment tasks. 
While the overall time series analysis did not show an overall learning effect, it did 
seem to show a practice effect. Figure 5 shows the average RTs over all trials. The larger 
RTs at the early stages represent a familiarizing with the task; this consequently reveals 
increased speed of response over time, while both problems types overlap and asymptote. 
Without unanalyzed practice problems to familiarize a person with the task prior to 
measuring decisions, RTs indicate that increased exposure to the problems quickened 
responses overall. When the accuracy effects are separated by group, some learning trends 
are discernible. The bias-resistant group tends to get better over time while the bias-
susceptible group appears to get worse over time. This meaningful, because it suggests that in 
each group, an overall strategy was formed during the task, which led to base-rate decisions 
(bias-resistant group) or stereotype decisions (bias-susceptible group) more often as trials 
progressed. Experiment 3 will explore the strategy component in more depth when feedback 
of performance is manipulated. 
While these data suggest that bias-susceptible and bias-resistant individuals approach 
the problems differently, there is not enough evidence to complete the overall description. 
The evidence does not support an inhibition failure bias from LIM, and since 
confidence/FOR was not measured on this task, it opens the possibility to tune the 
 51 
 
classification of ID utilizing storage and monitoring/detection failures. 
Furthermore, the base-rate neglect task is a social judgment task. Participants make 
inferences about people, not about objects or pretend situations. It is not necessarily a 
reasoning task per se; a test of the LIM/TSM and biases would be relegated to this task alone 
if no other reasoning is tested. In order for the LIM or TSM to be considered the cognitive 
framework for thinking in general, then it will need to explain and inform the observations on 
other judgment and reasoning tasks. Experiments 2 and 3 incorporate a conditional reasoning 
task to broaden the scope of the investigation. 
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Chapter III. 
Experiment 2 
This experiment continues the investigation into conflict detection and resolution, 
testing the LIM, the TSM, and the failure biases within them (De Neys, 2012, 2014a; De 
Neys & Bonnefon, 2013, Pennycook et al., 2015). The behavioral results of Experiment 1 
show that there is mixed support for the LIM, but stronger support for the TSM. It appears 
that conflict detection is not a universal and routine process, inhibition does not necessarily 
account for correct answers for all individuals, and biased responding is marked by different 
behaviors depending on overall base-rate task performance. The results point to monitoring 
failures (failures of conflict detection) as the crucial issue for people who tend to choose the 
stereotypes more often on base-rate problems. The TSM aligns with this conclusion 
(Pennycook et al., 2015). This represents a lack of T2 engagement on the majority of the 
problems. 
The goals of Experiment 2 were as follows: (1) To test the generality of the models 
described above by including an additional task within the reasoning realm: the LIM (De 
Neys, 2012; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) and TSM (Pennycook et al., 2015) were developed 
on the base-rate neglect task; it is unclear if their specifications generalize to a reasoning task 
such as conditional reasoning (qualitatively distinct from a judgment task like base-rate 
neglect). Though conflict detection is the major component of these two models, if they were 
designed to describe and explain the framework of the cognitive architecture, the findings on 
a conditional reasoning task should be similar to and reflect findings from the base-rate 
neglect task (for a review of De Neys’ boundary condition argument, see De Neys, 2014a). 
(2) To compare behavioral conflict monitoring with a metacognitive Feeling of Rightness 
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(FOR), which has been measured by confidence in one’s answer, as a converging source of 
monitoring failures. Thompson and colleagues have argued that this metacognitive FOR 
signals T2 engagement. When confidence is low in an initial response to a problem or 
situation, deliberation may be required, and T2 is engaged. Conversely, if confidence is high 
in an initial response, T2 will likely be ignored for further deliberation (Thompson, 2009; 
Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2013). This measure is inversely related to RTs, as 
low confidence would signal T2 engagement, thereby slowing responses; for high 
confidence, T1 responses will remain quick.  
 A similar methodology to Experiment 1 was used in the present study. However, 
several changes were made. First, the same base-rate problems from the first experiment 
were used. Second, a new, simple conditional reasoning task was added, utilizing some of the 
methodology of Thompson et al. (2011). The contrast in reasoning tasks can be compared 
directly, at the group and individual levels. In addition, performance replication on the base-
rate task from Experiment 1 to 2 is a priority. Third, the AOT as an individual difference 
measure was dropped due to its length and its high correlation with the NFC scale. This was 
also a practical consideration, as the addition of the conditional reasoning task increased the 
length of the entire experimental session dramatically. Last, each question for both of the 
main tasks had a confidence rating scale after each problem.  
Predictions  
Research Questions 4 and 5 were addressed in this experiment. Below are the basic 
predictions: 
 Behavioral predictions. (1) Overall base-rate task performance will replicate 
Experiment 1. Participants will have lower accuracy scores on conflict problems than 
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nonconflict problems, while also responding slower on those conflict problems (correct > 
incorrect RTs) than nonconflict problems, on both types of reasoning tasks. (2) This pattern 
will additionally replicate on the conditional problems. (3) Confidence will be inversely 
related to response time, wherein low confidence will likely engage T2 thinking, increasing 
processing times and high confidence will not engage T2, decreasing processing times. 
 Individual differences hypotheses. In addition to testing the basic predictions of the 
metacognitive monitoring failure hypothesis, the LIM and TSM model predictions were 
tested once again on the (1) base-rate neglect task as well as (2) the conditional reasoning 
task. (3) The overall prediction for the comparison of failures/errors on the two tasks is that it 
will be task-dependent. The difficulty of the conditional reasoning task will be the likely 
cause of the dependency. For example, storage failures are a viable bias on the conditional 
reasoning task, because this kind of task requires knowledge of what validity means vs. 
whether a conclusion is believable or not, which is relatively automatic. Relatedly, storage 
vs. monitoring failures will not be behaviorally different.  
Learning hypotheses. Over time, it was expected that Experiment 2 would follow 
the same patterns seen in Experiment 1. As each problem was randomized, it is likely that 
any given participant approaches each problem separately and without carryover from the 
previous problem. However, it was expected that overall confidence on both tasks would 
increase over time. This is due to the repetition factor—the more problems seen, the more 
likely a person becomes more confident in their answers. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred twelve undergraduates initially participated in this 
experiment for partial course credit. Ten participants were dropped from all analyses due to 
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incompletion of all experimental tasks (since most were within-subject variables). Thus, 102 
participants (Mage = 18.92, SD = 1.12, 62% female) were included in overall data analysis. As 
with Experiment 1, if a participant did not contribute to the all cells in a given statistical test, 
they were excluded. Those sub-Ns will be noted for each test. 
Design and materials. 
Base-rate task. This was the same as Experiment 1. 
 Conditional reasoning task. The conditional reasoning task was drawn heavily from 
Thompson et al. (2011) in order to test behavioral patterns from one reasoning/judgment task 
to another. A conditional reasoning task asks participants to complete an inference (drawing 
a conclusion) when the initial statement is presented in the form of “if p, then q”. Four 
inferences can be made from this single form: Modus Ponens (MP), Modus Tollens (MT), 
Affirming the Consequent (AC), and Denying the Antecedent (DA). The first two inferences 
are logically valid (i.e., the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises), and the 
second two inferences are logically invalid. An example is as follows: 
If a car runs out of gas, then it will stall.  
 
The car has run out of gas. Therefore it will stall. (MP: valid)  
The car has not stalled. Therefore it did not run out of gas. (MT: valid) 
The car has stalled. Therefore it ran out of gas. (AC: invalid) 
The car has not run out of gas. Therefore it will not stall. (DA: invalid) 
 
 There were 64 total problems, with 16 problems of each inference shown above. In 
order to create nonconflict and conflict problems, believability was manipulated. Half of the 
problems were believable, where p was a sufficient condition to bring about q in valid 
inferences or when p was a necessary condition to bring about q in invalid inferences; the 
other half of the problems were unbelievable, where p was not sufficient for q for valid 
inferences, or it was not at all necessary in the case of invalid inferences. Thus, there were 
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eight problems in each set of 16 that were believable and there were eight that were 
unbelievable. The problems either represented a causal conditional or a definitional 
conditional. All problems used for this task were originally developed in Thompson (1994). 
Refer to Appendix E for the entire set of problems. 
 For each conditional reasoning problem, the answer prompt was worded to mirror the 
base-rate task. For example, it appeared after the presentation of the two premises like this 
(from MP above): “Is the conclusion likely to follow from the premises?” This question was 
followed by a simple YES or NO response. A correct answer for valid conditionals was a 
YES response; for invalid conditionals it was a NO response. The results were coded as such 
for the dependent variable of accuracy. 
 Feeling of Rightness (FOR). Confidence ratings were added in this experiment as a 
measure of FOR. Participants responded to the question, “At the time I provided my answer, I 
felt:” They responded on Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7, where “1” represented a feeling of 
“guessing” and “7” represented a feeling of “certainty”. The remaining label was given 
above the midpoint of the scale, representing a feeling of “fairly certain”. This rating was 
given after each problem of both tasks and recorded a total of 114 times. 
Thinking disposition and cognitive ability measures. This experiment used the CRT, 
NFC, and the SAT score from Experiment 1. The AOT was dropped due to the inclusion of 
the conditional reasoning task and its length vs. the length of the AOT and relative 
unimportance of the disposition measures in the previous experiment. 
Procedure. Participants completed the each of the tasks at a computer station. Each 
student was introduced to the study and told that there were four stages to the experimental 
session. Participants first solved the three problems of the CRT. Participants then answered 
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the 50 base-rate problems. The order of these problems was fully randomized. Additionally, 
the answer was randomized, and it was either presented as the first option or second option 
(approximately 50% for each answer choice). Once the participant finished with those 
problems, they were given an opportunity to rest for 30 seconds. After the short rest period, 
participants answered the 64 conditional reasoning problems. The order of these questions 
was fully randomized. Once the participant finished these problems, they were given an 
additional opportunity to rest for 30 seconds. For all 114 problems across both tasks, 
participants were asked to rate their confidence in their answers after each individual 
problem, on the 1-7 Likert scale described above.  
 Upon finishing the two main tasks and the second rest period, instructions for the 
NFC appeared, describing the questionnaire and each of the corresponding scale values. The 
question order was randomized, and the scale appeared below each question. Finally, 
participants entered their most recent SAT score (out of 2400) and demographic information. 
Participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. The entire experimental session lasted 
approximately 45-60 minutes. 
Results: Base-rate Neglect Task 
 Accuracy. The base-rate task was analyzed in much the same way as in Experiment 
1. First, to replicate the accuracy (choosing the base-rate answer for each problem), 
nonconflict vs. conflict problems were compared. The prediction was a replication of the 
robust representativeness bias on conflict problems. Table 7 shows the means (SDs) for 
accuracy and reveals that this prediction was supported: nonconflict problems had reliably 
higher base-rate selections than conflict problems, t(101) = 19.20, p < .001, d = 1.86. 
Response time. The overall effect of RT was tested. Table 7 also shows that the 
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prediction that conflict problems would be slower than nonconflict problems (overall conflict 
detection) was supported: t(101) = 8.88, p < .001, d = .41. To test whether there was a 
distinct time difference between correct and incorrect responses on conflict problems, as well 
as nonconflict responses, an ANOVA was conducted. The difference between all three 
variables was significant, F(2, 184) = 49.53, p < .001, η2p = .35.6 Moreover, the overall RTs 
for each in planned pair comparisons were reliably different (LSD, all pairs, p < .001). There 
was a large difference between correct conflict and incorrect conflict responses, with the 
former leading to three additional seconds of processing, on average. This large three-second 
processing gap supports the LIM and TSM models and their claims that T2 processing is the 
function of seconds-level processing/deliberation. This also offered support for conflict 
detection and inhibition failure on the group level, but more individual parsing is needed. 
Conflict detection index. Experiment 1 offered mixed support for LIM model on the 
conflict detection and individual differences prediction. Figure 6 illustrates the positive 
relationship between the conflict detection index (incorrect conflict RT – nonconflict RT) 
and performance on conflict problems. This supported the TSM’s position that conflict 
monitoring is not routine or universal. This prediction was tested on this second sample. At 
the group-level, as stated above, the two measures in the index had distinct time stamps 
(t(92) = 4.62, p < .001, d = .33). To reiterate, support for the LIM requires no correlation 
between RT difference scores on this index and conflict performance, which would indicate 
relatively stable detection for all participants. To replicate support for the TSM, a positive 
correlation for that relationship is required. A positive correlation was found: r(91) = .39, p 
                                                
6 This test included 93 participants. Nine participants were excluded because they did not 
make any errors on conflict problems. 
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< .001, R2 = .15. Additionally, the intercept of this relationship was not significantly different 
from zero, which represents the lack of conflict detection or a mechanistic monitoring failure 
(b = -561 ms, t(91) = -1.09, p = .28) for a predicted individual who did not get a single 
problem correct on conflict problems. This relationship replicates the effect observed in 
Experiment 1.  
Inhibition index. The inhibition index (conflict correct RT – conflict incorrect RT) 
was again tested in this experiment. This is based on the LIM’s prediction of group 
differences applied on an individual differences level (De Neys, 2012). For the LIM, this 
index should increase as conflict accuracy increases, reflecting a greater reliance on 
inhibition for those individuals who choose the base-rate more often. For TSM, there is no 
direct model prediction (inhibition is deemed to be a function of cognitive decoupling). 
Figure 6 shows that there was a negative correlation: r(91) = -.30, p = .003, R2  = .09. There 
was a positive intercept to the regression line, indicating that low accuracy individuals did 
inhibit somewhat to achieve some correct answers on conflict problems (b = 4.06 s, t(91) = 
5.23, p < .001), but that those who chose the base-rate more often tended to be faster making 
correct responses than incorrect responses. This effect again replicated the observations of 
Experiment 1.  
Cognitive decoupling index. Last, the TSM model prediction of cognitive decoupling 
was tested. The cognitive decoupling index was created by subtracting nonconflict RT from 
conflict correct RT. The support for the TSM would show a negative relationship between 
this RT difference and conflict problem accuracy. Figure 6 shows that there was no 
relationship between the two measures, r(91) = -.04, p = .70, R2  = .002. The intercept was 
significantly different from zero (b = 3.50 s, t(91) = 5.22, p < .001), suggesting that correct 
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RTs are usually marked by positive differences with nonconflict RTs. This finding does not 
support the TSM and is not the same observation of Experiment 1.  
Feeling of Rightness (FOR) and metacognitive monitoring. This is a similar 
concept to the LIM/TSM models organization of conflict detection; if a person has fluency of 
answer generation, then the answer comes to mind fast (T1) and yields high metacognitive 
confidence. If T1 generates multiple responses initially (LIM/TSM: “conflict”), then 
metacognitive monitoring should produce lower confidence if the conflict is detected. These 
hypotheses were tested in two ways: (1) group analysis with average responses and (2) 
individual-level analysis with correlations with behavioral conflict monitoring (conflict 
detection index). The latter should maintain a negative relationship: as confidence (FOR) 
increases, then the conflict detection index value (RT difference between conflict incorrect 
responses and nonconflict overall) should decrease. If a person does not detect a conflict, 
his/her conflict detection index value will be low, but there will likely be a high 
metacognitive FOR. A 2 (Problem: nonconflict and conflict) x 2 (Response: correct and 
incorrect) ANOVA was conducted to test the group data on FOR responses. While there was 
no main effect of Problem (overall nonconflict and conflict had similar ratings of FOR). 
Nonconflict problems had an average FOR rating of 4.07 (SD = 1.36) while conflict 
problems had a lower average rating of 3.74 (SD = 1.31). There was a Response main effect, 
F(1, 71) = 17.44, p < .001, η2p  = .20, which led to a crossover interaction of the two 
variables: F(1, 71) = 113.01, p < .001, η2p  = .61. On conflict problems, participants were 
more confident with incorrect answers than correct answers. On nonconflict problems, 
participants were more confident with correct answers and this difference is much more 
pronounced (see Figure 7, Panel A). 
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There were marginal, negative correlations between metacognitive FOR and the 
detection index. Nonconflict problems had a stronger correlation overall, r(91) = -.17, p 
= .055, one-tailed (marginal, right direction). A more conclusive relationship would be the 
relationship on conflict problems, but this relationship was weaker, r(91) = -.15, p = .08, one-
tailed (marginal, right direction). This is mixed converging evidence. On the one hand, the 
direction of the effect is essential for this theoretical relationship, with metacognitive FOR, 
measured by confidence in an answer relating to the monitoring of a situation or problem and 
the subsequent engagement of a T2 processing. This inverse relationship carries over to the 
behavioral conflict detection measure directly based on RT. However, statistically, there is 
too much noise in one or both of the measures for the threshold of statistical significance.  
An additional Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted with average 
conflict and nonconflict FOR entered as covariates into the 2 (Problem) x 2 (Response) 
model with RT as the dependent measure; this model was rather conclusive, as neither 
covariate was a significant predictor in the model and it did not appear that confidence has 
any moderating effect on RTs (adjusted means were identical to the unadjusted means in the 
2 x 2 ANOVA). 
Results: Conditional Reasoning Task 
 Analysis of the conditional reasoning proceeded identically to the base-rate neglect 
task. An effort will be made in this section to discuss results of the task and dependent 
measures within this task, as well as a comparison to the results of the base-rate neglect to 
track if patterns of behavior and cognitive processes extend to a more traditional reasoning 
task.  
Preliminary analysis. To match the base-rate task and the dichotomy of nonconflict 
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and conflict problems in the base-rate neglect task, the conditional reasoning task was set up 
to match these conditions. The nonconflict set was comprised of valid-believable problems 
and invalid-unbelievable problems. The conflict set was comprised of valid-unbelievable and 
invalid-believable problems (see Evans et al., 1983, for a review). Before these problems 
were combined, comparison analyses were conducted to determine if a given response was 
more likely or faster than another (since accuracy is the method of performance, and not 
conclusion acceptance). On all problems, participants responded with equal speed to YES 
and NO responses across problems (ts(101) < 1.65, ps > .10). Additionally, a validity by 
belief ANOVA with accuracy as the dependent was conducted. Importantly for the 
combination of the above pairs, there was a significant logic and belief interaction (F(1, 101) 
= 297.66, p < .001, η2p = .75); accuracy for the nonconflict problem constituents was 
significantly greater than chance performance (.50; ps < .001), while the averages for the 
conflict problem constituents were significantly less than chance (ps < .02). These tests 
supported the combination of nonconflict and conflict problems for the remainder of analyses 
and for comparison with the effects of the base-rate neglect task. 
Accuracy. After combining the problem types into nonconflict and conflict to match 
the base-rate neglect task, similar analyses were conducted to determine if effects were task-
general. Table 7 displays the means (SDs) and reveals that was an accuracy effect, whereby 
participants were generally more accurate on nonconflict problems than conflict problems, 
t(101) = 17.25, p < .001, d = 1.97. Though the mean accuracy for nonconflict problems was 
lower on this task than the base-rate task, the pattern is similar for both problems, and as the 
reader can tell, the effect size is massive. 
Response time. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was general 
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conflict detection occurring, as well as overall T2 engagement. This test compared overall 
average nonconflict RT to average incorrect RT (conflict detection) and average correct RT 
(T2 engagement) on conflict problems. There was a significant effect: F(2, 202) = 4.76, p 
= .01, η2p  = .05. See Table 7 for mean RT (SDs) on this task. Planned paired difference tests 
revealed that correct conflict solutions took reliably longer (M = 8.8 s, SD = 3.46, p = .01) 
than incorrect conflict solutions (M = 7.9 s), marking general T2 engagement to arrive at a 
correct answer (by definition, the logical answer). There was no difference between 
nonconflict solutions (M = 8.1 s) and incorrect conflict solutions, and the latter was overall 
faster than the former. This result reflects a lack of overall conflict detection by participants. 
Conflict detection index. The conflict detection and monitoring hypotheses of the 
LIM and TSM were also tested. To reiterate the crucial predictions, the LIM postulates a flat 
relationship of the conflict detection index and a baseline of nonconflict RT (i.e., RT 
difference > 0). Alternatively, the TSM postulates a positive slope, with conflict detection 
increasing as accuracy on conflict problems increases. Figure 8 shows that this relationship 
was positive, but weak: r(100) = .17, p = .04, one-tailed, R2  = .03. However, as evidenced by 
the above group test, the intercept was significantly below zero, meaning more often 
participants were faster to get a conflict problem wrong than make any response on a 
nonconflict problem (b = -1.2 s, t(101) = -2.03, p = .05. This test combined with the other 
suggests that the majority of participants were not detecting conflict on this task and were 
generally making many errors on these problems.  
Inhibition index. While conflict correct responses were overall slower than conflict 
incorrect responses, what is the trend of inhibition for participants as a function of conflict 
performance (LIM)? There was no relationship: r(100) = .06, p = .26, one-tailed, R2 = .003, 
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see Figure 8. Additionally, the intercept was not significantly different from zero, which 
means that some participants were faster on correct responses, while other were slower (b = 
356 ms, t(101) = .36, p = .72. As with the conflict detection hypothesis, there isn’t clear 
evidence of inhibition on conflict problems. Some participants did slow when making a 
correct conflict decision, but with the intercept marked at less than half a second with a 
relatively flat slope, it is difficult to suggest that the source of the errors are inhibition 
failures or monitoring failures. 
Cognitive decoupling index. Do participants at least show a decoupling or 
rationalization pattern? The relationship between this index and conflict problem accuracy 
should be negative: less decoupling and therefore faster processing is needed as one makes 
more correct responses (TSM). The observed relationship in Figure 8 was weak, but in the 
opposite direction to the hypothesis, r(100) = .16, p = .05, one-tailed, R2 = .03. However, the 
intercept was not significantly different from zero and negative: b = -828 ms, t(101) = -.86, p 
= .39. This is not surprising, since there were no reliable differences among the RT measures. 
Participants were no more likely to spend more time on correct responses (to decouple) than 
any effort placed on nonconflict problems. In many cases, responses were faster.  
Feeling of Rightness (FOR) and metacognitive monitoring. A 2 (Problem) x 2 
(Response) ANOVA was conducted with FOR as the dependent measure.7 There was no 
main effect of Problem (F(1, 99) = .38, p = .54), nor a main effect of Response (F(1, 99) = 
2.41, p = .12). In the case of two Problem types, the average FOR was equal for nonconflict 
and conflict responses. FOR was rated the same for correct and incorrect responses on the 
                                                
7 This test included 100 participants. Two participants were excluded for not having any 
incorrect nonconflict or conflict responses. 
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task. There was a significant crossover interaction: F(1, 99) = 69.62, p < .001, η2p = .41. This 
is because on nonconflict problems, responses have approximately a .60 mean difference on 
accuracy (correct: M = 5.33, SD = 1.19; incorrect: M = 4.76, SD = 1.28; t(99) = 7.15, p 
< .001, d = .46). This pattern is flipped for conflict problems, with a -.44 mean difference (N 
= 102; correct: M = 4.86, SD = 1.28; incorrect: M = 5.30, SD = 1.17; t(101) = -6.70, p < .001, 
d = .36). As Figure 7, Panel B illustrates, it appears that participants were more confident in 
their nonconflict correct answers than incorrect answers (as one would reasonably expect), 
but were overall less confident in their correct answers than their incorrect answers. On its 
face, this might make sense if there was some conflict detection occurring: T2 engagement 
for the correct answer would require a lower sense of FOR, which would in turn increase RT. 
The overall data do not support these abstractions, however. 
The same 2 x 2 ANCOVA with RT as the dependent measure from the base-rate task 
was conducted with nonconflict and conflict FOR as covariates to determine if they account 
for any of the variance with RT. However, much like the base-rate task, FOR was not a 
significant predictor of RTs and it did not have any moderating effect on RTs from the 
original stats model (adjusted means were identical to unadjusted means). 
Last, correlations were run between nonconflict FOR and the conflict detection index, 
as well as conflict FOR and conflict detection index. Both correlations were effectively zero 
(nonconflict: r(100) = .01, p = .94; conflict: r(100) = -.02, p = .81). 
Results: Individual Differences and Time Series 
 Individual differences. Table 8 contains the correlations between the accuracy and 
FOR of both tasks and the cognitive ability (CRT and SAT) and thinking disposition (NFC) 
measures. There were a number of interesting relationships between the individual 
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differences measures and the base-rate and conditional reasoning performance/confidence 
measures.  
CRT scores were positively correlated with both SAT and NFC scores, suggesting 
that ability measures converged and ability was related to a domain-general desire for 
complex cognitive activities. CRT scores were not correlated with accuracy or FOR ratings 
on the base-rate task, but there were small correlations between CRT scores and conditional 
reasoning conflict problem accuracy, as well as with both problem type FOR ratings.  
In contrast with CRT, SAT scores were positively correlated with nonconflict and 
conflict accuracy on the base-rate task but not the conditional reasoning task. It was also 
positively correlated with the base-rate conflict detection index (not reported in Table 8, 
r(82) = .22, p = .04). This suggests that general cognitive ability is related to conflict 
monitoring. 
Interestingly, NFC scores were only correlated with FOR ratings for both tasks. This 
likely reflects a motivational component described by the scale. If one desires to engage in 
complex cognitive activities, then confidence ratings on tasks designed to be complex 
cognitive activities should generally be positively related. However, the motivational 
component expressed here by the confidence ratings and NFC composite scores is beyond 
the scope of this investigation. Perhaps the more glaring result is that neither 
reasoning/judgments task was correlated with this thinking disposition scale, which is 
contrary to the results of Experiment 1 and other findings (e.g., Pennycook, Trippas, et al., 
2014; Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2015). 
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 Base-rate neglect. A similar median split analysis8 from Experiment 1 was conducted 
on this dataset (Mdn = .40) and two groups were created: bias-susceptible participants (n = 
48) and bias-resistant participants (n = 24). There was no three-way interaction between bias 
group, problem type, and response on RT or FOR ratings. Bias-susceptible participants were 
reliably faster overall than bias-resistant participants (approximately 2 seconds, F(1, 70) = 
4.55, p = .04, η2p = .06; there were differences between the two groups on FOR ratings. The 
pattern of responses (large crossover interaction of problem by response) for bias-susceptible 
participants on RT and FOR replicate Experiment 1. In this experiment, bias-resistant 
participants also show this same crossover interaction, with slightly slower RTs overall. This 
effect is distinct from that observed in Experiment 1. Thus, according to this analysis, there 
were no individual differences between the two groups, contrary to the results obtained 
previously. 
 A confirmatory discriminant function analysis was also conducted. Utilizing the same 
predictor variables (minus the AOT), the function was able to differentiate the two groups (χ2 
= 82.94, df = 8, p < .001). However, other than accuracy on the task, no other predictor could 
successfully place participants into susceptible or resistant groups. 
 Conditional reasoning. An additional median split analysis9 was conducted on the 
new conditional reasoning task (Mdn = .38). There were no reliable differences between bias-
susceptible participants (n = 52) and bias-resistant participants (n = 48) on RT or FOR 
ratings. Bias-susceptible participants trend faster overall responses than bias-resistant 
                                                
8 The test included 72 participants. Thirty participants were excluded for not contributing 
values for RT or FOR in each cell of the statistical model. 
 
9 The test included 100 participants. Two participants were excluded for not contributing 
values for RT or FOR in each cell of the statistical model. 
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participants, but this difference is approximately 400 ms. This is not enough RT difference to 
differentiate response patterns and it does not reflect additional processing beyond T1 (which 
bias-resistant participants who detect conflict would move beyond T1 into T2). 
 The discriminant function analysis revealed a lack of clear distinction between bias-
susceptible and bias-resistant groups using the same predictors as the base-rate neglect task 
(χ2 = 14.86, df = 8, p = .06). This finding represents additional clear evidence that the two 
tasks are distinct. 
Time series analysis. Like Experiment 1, tracking how participants did over time can 
help explain how participants complete these tasks. The same analyses as in Experiment 1 
were conducted here. 
 Base-rate neglect. There was a large difference in accuracy across all problems. 
Though both regression lines were positive, there were no reliable practice or learning effects 
across the set of problems averaged over participants. For RT, practice effects were observed 
on both problem types. Conflict problems overall were slower than nonconflict problems, but 
the relationships were not significantly different from each other. This was likely due to the 
first few problems causing participants to take a little more time before answering since they 
likely had not seen the task before. Once they were acclimated to the task, they began to 
quicken. In the case of the FOR measure, average confidence rested between points 4 and 5 
on the scale across problems and participants (which is above the midpoint of the scale). 
Conflict problems engendered a slightly lower confidence overall, but the trends were 
effectively parallel. 
 The accuracy and RT effects over trials replicated Experiment 1. The trends in this 
experiment were slightly flatter for accuracy than Experiment 1; the RT trends continued to 
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reflect practice effects. 
 Conditional reasoning. Participants tended to get less accurate over time on 
nonconflict problems (r = -.39); conversely, they appeared to get more accurate on conflict 
problems (r = .27) over time. Noticeably, nonconflict problems got much more variable and 
erratic as more problems were tackled. As evidenced by the group tests discussed above, RT 
differences were essentially nonexistent in this data set. RT time series revealed that 
nonconflict and conflict problems had the same pattern. Participants started slow and sped up 
as they went through the problems, showing a practice effect on the first few problems due to 
novelty. In the case of the FOR measure, flat relationships were observed. Confidence ratings 
were above 5 on the scale and do not vary much from there across all problems. 
 Since this task was not in Experiment 1, no cross-experiment comparison can be 
made. However, these patterns can be compared to the base-rate neglect task. The RT and 
FOR measures are essentially the same for both tasks: RT trends reflected a practice effect 
and FOR trends were as flat as the base-rate task. Accuracy trends deviated in this task 
compared to the base-rate task.  
Discussion 
 The goals of Experiment 2 were to (1) extend two existing dual process models in 
base-rate neglect to a qualitatively different reasoning task, that is, conditional reasoning 
(Markovits, Thompson, & Brisson, 2015; Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson, 1994). 
Additionally, the models (LIM and TSM; De Neys, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2015) tested in 
Experiment 1 were extended to this dataset for replication and extension purposes, and (2) 
explore the notion of metacognitive monitoring within the DPTs framework utilizing a 
measure of confidence in one’s answer as evidence for behavioral decisions (e.g., Thompson 
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et al., 2011).  
 Base-rate neglect. On the base-rate task, the general findings of Experiment were 
replicated. There was a robust conflict detection effect that was replicated. Accuracy effects 
were replicated, as well. There was a clear distinction between nonconflict preferences for 
the base-rate answer (high) vs. this preference on conflict problems (low). However, stronger 
effects were observed here for some hypotheses. For example, there was support for 
behavioral inhibition measuring RTs at the group level (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), which 
was not observed in the previous experiment. The conflict detection index effect was 
reduced, but there remained a significant relationship between conflict detection and 
choosing the base-rate answer on conflict problems. Though the group test for inhibition 
yields support for the LIM (De Neys, 2012; De Neys, 2014a), the inhibition index is not 
supportive of this model. A negative relationship was observed between inhibition RT 
difference scores and the choice of the base-rate answer on conflict problems, suggesting that 
as accuracy increases, participants get faster on correct answers to the task. Finally, there was 
no support for the cognitive decoupling index’s relationship with base-rate answers on 
conflict problems. 
On the face of these observations, there is still mixed support for both the LIM and 
TSM, with the strength of evidence tilted toward the conclusion that conflict detection is not 
routine and universal (TSM; Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2015). Inhibition 
evidence is contradictory to its conceptual definition—bias-resistant participants are not 
engaging in inhibition (T2) to achieve correct answers (De Neys, 2012). This finding, along 
with that of Experiment 1, are not aligned with the idea in LIM (and even the TSM) that T2 
engagement always follows from successful conflict detection. In actuality, the bias-resistant 
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participants in this experiment rarely spent much extra time considering the base-rate after 
realizing it was a better answer than the stereotype. It appears they actually utilize T1 
processing whereby the logical intuition is the more salient response, leading to an overall 
faster answer (Handley & Trippas, 2015; Pennycook et al., 2015). The cognitive decoupling 
index supports this idea: decoupling reflects the time difference between inhibition and 
detection, and these two indices are in direct opposition with each other. The final piece of 
this puzzle will be explored in Experiment 3 with an additional dataset to explore. 
The second important piece to this effort was the role of metacognitive monitoring 
(Thompson, 2009; Thompson et al., 2011) in the form of a Feeling of Rightness (FOR). A 
high FOR is marked by high confidence in an initial response and fluency of response 
generation (Thompson et al., 2013). Overall, it was hypothesized that a failure of 
metacognitive monitoring is a failure of conflict monitoring, which is in turn a failure of 
conflict detection (De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013; Thompson et al., 2011). On the base-rate 
neglect task, FOR differences were observed as an interaction of problem type and response 
on those problems. Higher FOR ratings were generated more often when a person made a 
stereotype choice on conflict problems than when a base-rate choice was made. This pattern 
reverses on nonconflict problems. The ratings of observed confidence and the differences 
between groups match the outcomes of Thompson et al.’s (2011) Experiments 1 and 2, in 
which confidence differences were small but invariable within groups. These effects point to 
stability participants expressed throughout the task. It makes sense: the problems do not 
change in structure, merely content. Regardless of this stability, however, the full interaction 
of problem and response reflects overconfidence, a reflection of the saliency of the 
stereotypes on the conflict problems (Pennycook, Trippas, et al., 2014; Swan & Revlin, 2015; 
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Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013), rather than the making uneasy base-rate selections. Crucially, 
these FOR ratings did not interact with RTs, suggesting a possible hindsight bias with the 
confidence rating appearing after the problem and decision. 
The marginal correlations of FOR and the conflict detection index yet still offer 
mixed support as converging evidence that metacognitive FOR reflects a general conflict 
monitoring failure. More data is needed and additional analysis will occur in the next 
experiment. 
Conditional reasoning. The comparison of effects from the base-rate task and 
conditional reasoning tasks was empirically and theoretically important to determine if the 
models (LIM and TSM) created based on base-rate neglect transferred to other tasks (task-
general or task-specific models). First, the base-rate neglect task relies on the heavy-handed 
distinction between probability (arguably an implicit intuition among most adults; Pennycook 
& Thompson, 2012; Pennycook, Trippas, et al., 2014) and person categorization/relative ease 
and adaptive quality of stereotypes (Hutchison & Martin, 2015; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The representativeness heuristic within the base-rate task is 
robust and is rarely thwarted (regardless if you ask for probability judgments, e.g., in 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973 or Thompson et al., 2011, or if you ask for a dichotomous 
forced choice, e.g., in De Neys & Glumicic, 2008 or Pennycook et al., 2011). On the other 
hand, in conditional reasoning, you have a class of tasks that relies heavily on logical 
deductive reasoning (e.g., syllogistic reasoning or conditional reasoning), wherein the 
structure of the premises and conclusions is the sole contributor to validity. These tasks add 
conflict by manipulating the believability of the premises, conclusions, or both, by 
modification of the semantics of the statements. Invariably, there are more moving parts to 
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this type of reasoning task than the base-rate neglect task. The purpose of comparing these 
two distinct tasks is not to state which task is better or better reflects human intelligence or 
rationality, but to determine whether the current dual process models (namely TSM and 
LIM), developed with the base-rate neglect task, can describe and explain behaviors on a 
qualitatively different task. If they cannot, a new model that task-general is theoretically 
warranted. 
Creating nonconflict and conflict problems to match the structure of the base-rate task 
yielded a similar accuracy effect: nonconflict problems had significantly more correct 
answers (choosing YES when an argument was valid and choosing NO when an argument 
was invalid) than conflict problems. However, the replication of effects ends here. RT 
analyses revealed a lack of conflict detection by group or individual-level analyses; many 
participants were actually faster to get a conflict problem incorrect than make any decision 
on nonconflict problems. There was an inhibition effect (LIM), but only at the group level. 
Variation among RTs on the conditional reasoning was too similar, reflecting very limited T2 
activation among all participants (bias-susceptible and bias-resistant). The conflict detection, 
inhibition, and cognitive decoupling indices were either not different from zero or in the 
wrong direction, erasing all support for the model predictions of both the LIM and TSM.  
Perhaps the only meaningful comparative finding between tasks was an interaction of 
problem and response on FOR. The same overconfidence effect was observed on conflict 
problems. Thus, a high sense of confidence in an answer reduces T2 engagement, leading to 
a frequent incorrect solution. The link between FOR and T2 engagement is replicated across 
tasks, but again, RTs to accurately reflect T2 engagement were not affected by FOR ratings. 
In addition, there was no relationship between FOR ratings and the conflict detection index. 
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This is likely due to the lack of conflict detection on this task in general; FOR appears to be 
the more sensitive measure of conflict monitoring than RT on this task; this also aligns with 
the results of Thompson et al. (2011). 
In sum, the results of Experiment 2 offered support for the idea that conflict detection 
is imperfect, relating to the idea that monitoring failures are an important individual 
difference to consider in this dual process framework (Handley & Trippas, 2015; Pennycook 
et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2015). The results supported the model predictions of the TSM 
over the LIM. The base-rate task is an important piece to these two dual process models, but 
they are likely attributable in this way because of their development with the task (De Neys, 
2012, 2014a; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook et al., 2015). Conditional reasoning 
does not translate to the model predictions of the TSM and the LIM; these models are task-
specific. These tasks were re-used in Experiment 3 to continue to collect more data for 
replication and extension purposes. Finally, are the individual differences failure accounts 
(monitoring, inhibition) modular (De Neys, 2012, 2014a; De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013) and 
would a manipulation of feedback interact with conflict monitoring and FOR? Experiment 3 
utilizes a feedback manipulation to address this question. 
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Chapter IV. 
Experiment 3 
 The first two experiments of this dissertation attempted to address the two recent 
models in DPTs, integrate more individual-level analyses beyond that of group effects (De 
Neys, 2014a; Pennycook et al., 2015), and apply a task-general lens to these two models that 
have been developed solely with base-rate neglect. Experiment 3 adds to these endeavors, but 
focuses more on the role of the role of individual differences (storage, monitoring, and 
inhibition) and whether they are actual modal processes, as argued by De Neys and 
colleagues (De Neys, 2014a; De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013). The substantial way to test this 
postulate is to offer feedback to reasoners within both tasks that is meant to interact with 
conflict monitoring and detection. Thus, through this experiment, I have linked the model 
predictions of the LIM and the TSM, the hypotheses of monitoring failures as failures of 
conflict detection, and that conflict monitoring is an associated concept to metacognitive 
monitoring, as reflected by FOR. 
 The present experiment is designed to offer feedback that would interact mainly with 
confidence in an initial T1 response. Without any feedback, individuals solving reasoning 
problems or making judgments would likely utilize a strategy they find most salient. Bias-
susceptible people would rely on initial T1 responses when it is strongest or salient, whereas 
bias-resistant people would typically utilize better strategies for more normative responding. 
In both cases, an initial FOR would likely dictate the course of responding—high FOR, less 
T2 engagement; low FOR, more T2 engagement. The type of feedback given here is 
important because it needs to impact confidence/FOR in a meaningful way. Other than 
explicitly telling a person that they are approaching a given task incorrectly, confidence 
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could be impacted by feedback that is designed to reflect the strength of performance (a 
percentage correct or related measure) or relative standing with other who have completed 
the task in the past. Manipulating this feedback can have the desired impact on confidence 
without directly addressing the normative strategies necessary to complete a base-rate neglect 
task or a conditional reasoning task. Previous research has shown that offering feedback can 
shift a decision criterion in a recognition task (Aminoff et al., 2012), increase counterfactual 
thinking (a T2 function; Roese, 1997), and induce positive or negative emotions depending if 
false feedback was given as excellent or poor, respectively (Evers, de Ridder, & Adriaanse, 
2009). A central question is can this feedback interact enough with the initial FOR to induce 
a change in behavior that is indicative of T2 engagement, such as increased processing times 
after feedback is given (Thompson et al., 2011)? Would this effect reflect the modal nature of 
the failure hypotheses (namely monitoring)? 
In DPTs and reasoning research described above, few studies (e.g., De Neys, 2014b) 
have offered the participant feedback for their performance on individual problems. In the 
studies conducted by De Neys, utilizing the LIM as the basis of his predictions, he found that 
participants were faster and more accurate on conflict problems when given feedback. He 
argued that the faster RTs on conflict problems reflect an interaction with inhibition 
failures—participants had to have already recognized the conflict (conflict detection). 
Feedback did not interact with monitoring failures: it did not help people who did not 
initially realize there was a conflict between the heuristically-cued response and the 
normative/probabilistic/logically-cue response (De Neys, 2014b). 
The LIM predicts and is supported by these data from De Neys (2014b). Additionally, 
he conducted the studies utilizing the conjunction fallacy task (the “Linda” problem; 
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Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) and categorical syllogisms (De Neys, 2006). The latter is 
important for my studies—it appears he garnered support for his model that spans two 
qualitatively different tasks (social inference and logical inference). However, the feedback 
manipulation used in De Neys (2014b) was not intended to interact with confidence in 
responses, which is a possible contributor to monitoring issues not addressed in the LIM. 
 Experiment 3 was designed to manipulate a participant’s confidence (FOR) in their 
answers. Specifically, falsely suggesting a participant’s performance is worse than a fictitious 
dataset or giving them true feedback was intended to decrease confidence in previous 
decisions on a set amount of trials. In contrast, falsely suggesting a participant’s performance 
is better than a fictitious dataset was intended to inflate confidence and possibly increase 
erroneous responses post-feedback. All participants solved the same 50 problems on the 
base-rate neglect task and conditional reasoning task from Experiments 1 and 2. Halfway 
through each task, a rest break was initiated and the participant was presented with 
information regarding their performance. The False-High feedback group received two 
pieces of information regarding performance: a predetermined high percentage correct and 
the relative standing that their performance was better than the top 10% of people who have 
completed the same task. The False-Low group was the opposite: they received a 
predetermined low percentage correct and given the relative standing that their performance 
was worse than the bottom 10% of people who have completed the same task. The True 
feedback group received their actual, calculated percentage correct without information 
regarding their relative standing. The Control group did not receive feedback (they would 
still receive a break halfway through the trials). This final control group was utilized for 
replication purposes to compare behavioral outcomes with Experiments 1 and 2, as well as to 
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act as a no-manipulation control for the feedback manipulation variable. 
Predictions 
The question of whether providing feedback on these two tasks would interact with 
confidence (Research Question 6) was addressed in this experiment. Basic predictions were 
as follows for this experiment: (1) The False-Low and True feedback groups will have better 
accuracy on conflict problems than the False-High or Control groups post-feedback because 
the instigation of lowered confidence should decrease FOR and increase T2 engagement for 
more normative/logical responses. (2) Similarly, RTs overall and on conflict problems will 
be higher for the False-Low and True feedback groups post feedback than the False-High or 
Control groups, which reflects an increase in conflict monitoring efficacy and T2 
engagement (Thompson et al., 2011). (3) There should be an interaction of feedback group 
and feedback presence (pre- or post-feedback) on accuracy, RT, and FOR. (4) The previous 
predictions tested in Experiments 1 and 2 were also tested here within the feedback 
manipulation. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred thirty-five undergraduates participated in this experiment 
for partial course credit. As with Experiment 2, participants who did not complete the task 
were excluded from all analyses (five participants were excluded from all analyses for not 
completing the task or leaving unrealistic responses on the base-rate or conditional reasoning 
tasks). Thus, 130 total participants were analyzed in this study (Mage = 19.2 years, SD = 2.59, 
78% female). Participants who did not contribute to all variables in a statistical model were 
excluded, as per the previous two experiments. The sub-Ns are noted for each test. 
Design and materials. A 4 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial design was utilized for this 
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experiment. The first independent variable was feedback group, a between-subjects variable. 
One group received feedback that was designed to increase their sense of confidence in their 
ongoing performance by suggesting that their performance was significantly better on the 
task than the top 10% of people who have completed the task (False-High group, n = 36). A 
second group received feedback that was designed to decrease their sense of confidence by 
suggesting that their performance was significantly worse than the bottom 10% of people 
who have completed the task (False-Low group, n = 31). A third group received minimal, but 
true, feedback—a direct computation of their performance through the first part of each task 
(True feedback group, n = 34). The feedback for these three groups was presented halfway 
through each task. Specifically, feedback was presented after the 25th problem on the base-
rate task and after the 32nd problem on the conditional reasoning task. The three feedback 
groups each received a percentage of performance on the first half; the false groups received 
a fixed value that was either high or low, to match with the phrase of relative performance. 
This percentage was different for each task, so the message wasn’t exactly the same from 
base-rate task to conditional reasoning task. The True feedback group saw only the 
percentage and no relative standing. The final group did not receive any feedback (Control 
group, n = 29), but did receive a break of equal length halfway through each task. The second 
independent variable (within-subjects) was the comparison between performance and 
decision of the first half (before feedback) and the second half (after feedback) of each task. 
The final independent variable (within-subjects) was the type of problem, described in the 
previous experiments: nonconflict problems and conflict problems. 
 Measures of interest matched those collected in Experiment 2: accuracy, response 
times (RTs) and confidence/FOR. 
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Base-rate task. This task was replicated from Experiments 1 and 2. 
Conditional reasoning task. This task was replicated from Experiment 2. 
Individual differences measures. These measures remained the same from 
Experiment 2. 
Procedure. The procedure for this experiment matched closely with Experiment 2. 
The task order remained the same from the previous experiment, and question order (conflict 
vs. nonconflict problems) remained randomized. Changes that occurred for this study: A 
break after the 25th trial (on the base-rate task) and the 32nd trial (on the conditional reasoning 
task) was added for each group to display feedback. For the false feedback groups, a faux 
calculation score was displayed and underneath this score on the screen appeared the relative 
standing phrase according to the feedback group (above top 10% or below bottom 10%). The 
true feedback group simply saw a percentage score of their performance on the first half of 
the trials for each task. The control group only received a message to rest. The entire rest 
period for all four groups was 30 seconds. After the break, the remaining half of the trials per 
task began immediately. Following the NFC and demographic questions, two additional 
open-ended questions were asked. The first question was asked to all of the groups and 
specifically asked the participants to describe their strategy on the task. The second task was 
only presented to the feedback groups and it asked whether the participant changed their 
strategy after the feedback display. After completing the final strategy questions, participants 
were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. 
Results: Base-rate Neglect Task 
 Preliminary analyses. Analyses were conducted on the Control group to test whether 
effects replicated from the previous experiments. In the Control group, base-rate answers 
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were chosen more often on nonconflict problems than conflict problems, t(28) = 8.74, p 
< .001, d = 1.69. The overall RT effect replicated as well: nonconflict problems had the 
fastest responses overall with a significant increase to incorrect conflict responses, F(2, 54) = 
8.74, p = .001, η2p = .24.10 The planned paired comparisons revealed that nonconflict RT to 
incorrect conflict RT increase was significant (Mean Difference = 2.80 seconds, p < .001), 
but that the difference between incorrect and correct responses was not significant (Mean 
Difference = 1.35 seconds, p = .29), but in the predicted direction (a greater difference for 
these two levels than in Experiment 1). On FOR, nonconflict problems had a higher 
confidence rating, t(28) = 5.00, p < .001, d = .42. With these basic results essentially the 
same behavioral observations as the previous two experiments, the remaining hypothesis 
analyses were tested. 
 Second, the performance pre-feedback (Pre-FB) needed a confirmatory test to 
determine if all four groups went through the first half of the task similarly before any 
manipulation occurred (a pretest). The tests conducted were the same as the replication 
analyses. A 4 (Feedback Group) x 2 (Problem) ANOVA was conducted on accuracy. There 
were no Group differences (F(3, 126) = .28, p = .84) nor an interaction (F(3, 126) = .28, p 
= .84). There was an expected main effect of Problem, wherein all groups had higher 
accuracy on nonconflict problems than conflict problems, F(1, 126) = 367.48, p < .001, η2p 
= .75. The same 4 x 2 ANOVA was run on RTs; there was a marginal effect of Group, F(3, 
126) = 2.65, p = .051, η2p = .06. It appears the False-Low feedback group was overall slower 
(approximately two seconds) than the other three groups before any feedback was given. 
                                                
10 For the RT analysis of the control group, one person was omitted from the analysis for not 
having any incorrect conflict responses (n = 28). 
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There was also an expected effect of Problem, F(1, 126) = 63.66, p < .001, η2p = .34. Though 
there was a minor difference of the feedback groups, there was no interaction of these two 
variables (F(3, 126) = 2.46, p = .07). On FOR, there was no effect of Group, F(3, 126) = .40, 
p = .75. There was only the expected effect of Problem, F(1, 126) = 68.24, p < .001, η2p 
= .35, whereby nonconflict problems were rated with higher confidence than conflict 
problems. No interaction of the two variables was observed, F(3, 126) = .29, p = .83. The 
pre-FB scores were then entered into post-FB statistical models as a covariate to account for 
performance before feedback manipulation. Special attention was paid to the False-Low 
feedback group to determine if the group was inherently different and confounds in selection 
existed. 
 Main analyses. The remaining analyses were conducted to test the main study 
hypotheses for the base-rate neglect task. Three main 4 (Group) x 2 (Problem) x 2 (Pre/Post-
Feedback) ANCOVAs were conducted with accuracy, RT, and FOR as separate dependent 
measures. Pre-FB scores were entered into these statistical models as covariates to control for 
performance on these measures before the main feedback manipulation. Table 9 shows the 
means and standard deviations for the various effects described below. 
 Accuracy. First, there was no Group main effect; each group has the same relative 
average performance across problem type and feedback, F(3, 125) = .26, p = .85. Across the 
entire task, base-rates were chosen more often on nonconflict problems than conflict 
problems, as expected, F(1, 125) = 367.30, p < .001, η2p = .75. There was also a main effect 
of Feedback, whereby all the groups did slightly better after feedback than prior to feedback. 
This led to a Problem by Feedback interaction, because the increase was greater on conflict 
problems post-FB, F(1, 125) = 7.04, p = .009, η2p = .05. No other effects or interactions were 
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significant. Overall pre-FB accuracy was a significant predictor of accuracy, F(1, 125) = 
598.02, p < .001, η2p = .83. This covariate interacted with Problem and Feedback variables 
(separately), Fs(1, 125) > 8.64, ps < .004, η2ps = .07. It did not interact with Group, however. 
This is likely due to the fact that with the covariate entered into the model, each condition 
improved after FB was given. The False-Low group appeared to have improved the most on 
conflict problems; however, this is increase is not significant. Interestingly, the control group 
got slightly worse on nonconflict problems post-FB. With minimal information given to help 
improve their problems, True feedback participants had the flattest increase on conflict 
problems. 
 Response time. There were limited effects on RT in the omnibus test. First, there was 
no Group main effect, F(3, 125) = .58, p = .63. Additionally, there was no overall Problem 
main effect, F(1, 125) = .79, p = .38. In addition, there was no main effect of feedback, F(1, 
125) = 1.33, p = .25. No main interactions were significant (two-way or the three-way). The 
majority of the variance in this model was accounted by the pre-FB covariate, (F(1, 125) = 
1330.38, p < .001, η2p = .91. This led to an interaction of the covariate and Problem, and the 
covariate and Feedback condition. The data show that everyone in all four groups got faster 
in the second half of the problems from the first half. In addition, the difference between 
conflict problems and nonconflict problems was approximately three seconds slower in all 
groups. Feedback did not differentially affect any of the feedback groups as predicted (e.g., a 
less steep RT difference of speed in the False-Low feedback group signaling a noticeable 
slowing of decisions). 
 FOR. A similar story to RT is present for confidence/FOR scores. First, there was no 
main effect present for Group, F(3, 125) = .89, p = .45. There was a main effect of Problem, 
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F(1, 125) = 6.66, p = .01, η2p = .05, but no main effect of feedback, F(1, 125) = .05, p = .83. 
However, this did not lead to a Problem by Feedback interaction, as predicted. Group did not 
interact with either variable. Pre-FB FOR ratings were a significant covariate in the model 
(F(1, 125) = 876.96, p < .001, η2p = .88), accounting for approximately 88% of the unique 
variance of FOR ratings. From all appearances, the manipulation did have the intended effect 
by reducing confidence ratings in the False-Low feedback group, but these mean differences 
are not significant—though they were similarly small when compared to the differences 
observed in FOR throughout this study. Interestingly, the feedback given in the False-Low 
condition actually decreased FOR ratings for nonconflict problems at a greater rate than 
conflict problems (adjusted means, Mean Differences = .49 and .31, respectively). Moreover, 
the confidence decrease in this group was significant on those nonconflict problems, which 
was not observed in the other three groups (see Table 9). 
A final ANCOVA of Group by Problem on RT that included post-FOR as a covariate 
was conducted to determine if the reduction of confidence in the False-Low group lead to 
longer processing times (pre-FB RT was also entered into the model as a second covariate to 
match the test in the previous paragraph). Post-FB FOR was not a significant predictor of RT 
across problems. Adjusted RT means actually show that on conflict problems, the False-Low 
feedback group was the fastest of the four groups (not a reliable difference, however). 
 Conflict detection hypothesis.  The relationship between conflict problem accuracy 
and the RT difference between incorrect conflict responses and nonconflict responses 
(conflict detection index) was explored across feedback groups and separately within the 
feedback groups. Across all participants in the study, there was clear support for the TSM, 
r(119) = .50, p < .001, R2 = .25. Figure 9 illustrates the conflict detection index by group. It 
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shows that all feedback groups and the control group have the same overall relationship: rs 
> .40, ps < .05. None of the correlation coefficients are different from the others. Thus, in all 
groups, participants who selected the stereotype more often on conflict problems did not do 
well at detecting conflict, whereas participants who selected the base-rates more often on 
conflict problems were able to detect the conflict and continue to increase the time spent 
deliberating even when they got the problem incorrect. Additionally, the intercept was not 
significantly different than zero, or no RT difference, showing the lack of conflict detection 
for those participants who made more stereotype selections on conflict problems (-913 ms, 
t(119) = -1.78, p = .08). 
 Inhibition hypothesis. The relationship between the inhibition index (correct conflict 
responses – incorrect conflict responses) and conflict problem accuracy was tested. Low 
accuracy participants in all groups spent more time inhibiting on correct responses, but as 
performance on conflict problems increased, participants who made fewer errors spent less 
time to making a correct response than making an incorrect response in general (rs < -.36, ps 
< .05; across groups R2 = .27, see Figure 9). The relationship is further support against the 
LIM. The overall intercept here was significantly greater than zero, representing the greater 
amount of time needed for inhibition for participants who made many errors (4.9 s, t(119) = 
6.58, p < .001). 
 Cognitive decoupling hypothesis. For the entire sample, there was a negative 
relationship between the cognitive decoupling index and conflict problem accuracy, r(118) = 
-.22, p = .02, R2 = .05. The intercept for this relationship is significantly greater than zero as 
well, 4.0 s, t(119) = 5.90, p < .001. Participants who made fewer errors spent more time on 
correct conflict judgments than overall nonconflict judgments in general. So participants who 
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made more errors, on the few correct conflict judgments they had, ultimately spent less time 
decoupling. This is the first time in the data presented that the TSM Decoupling hypothesis 
was supported. Additionally, each Group separately had a negative relationship between the 
two variables, but these were flatter relationships (ps > .06, see Figure 9). 
Feedback interaction with detection, inhibition, and cognitive decoupling. Table 10 
shows the correlations of the three above indices with conflict problem performance before 
and after feedback. The majority of the correlations are not significant (flat), but the presence 
of feedback seems to change behavior patterns for some participants. There were no observed 
correlation differences between pre-FB and post-FB. 
 Conflict detection and FOR. There was no relationship between conflict 
detection/monitoring and metacognitive monitoring (FOR), r(118) = .03, p = .74. 
Interestingly, parsing out the correlations by group reveals interacting relationships. The 
Control group and the False-Low feedback group each had negative correlations between the 
two monitoring measures. The other two groups, True feedback and False-High feedback 
groups each had positive correlations. However, with each groups relatively small sample 
sizes, these effect sizes were not reliably different from zero. 
Results: Conditional Reasoning Task 
 Preliminary analyses. The same procedure used in the Experiment 2 analysis to 
combine the conditional reasoning task variables was utilized here. Overall, YES and NO 
responses across all problems were equally fast (ts(129) < 1.21, ps > .23). The validity by 
belief ANOVA with accuracy as the dependent variable revealed the important interaction 
between these two variables, F(1, 129) = 554.70, p < .001, η2p = .81. Correct decisions on 
valid-believable and invalid-unbelievable problems were significantly greater than chance 
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(ps < .001); invalid-unbelievable decisions were significantly less than chance (p < .001); 
valid-unbelievable decisions were not different from chance, but approximately 57% of 
participants’ decisions fell below .50, which made a reasonable situation to combine these 
latter two problem types into conflict problems. 
The same two preliminary tests from the base-rate neglect task were conducted on the 
conditional reasoning problems: First, the validity by believability ANOVA from the 
previous paragraph was replicated within the Control group; there was an interaction of logic 
and belief. The pattern of accuracy closely aligned with the overall dataset, but again, 
participants were close to chance on valid-unbelievable problems. The assumption to 
combine them with invalid-believable problems to create conflict problems was retained, 
however. 
For overall accuracy, there was a large effect on accuracy between the problems, 
t(28) = 10.87, p < .001, d = 2.47. Participants in the Control group made correct decisions on 
nonconflict problems (M = .78, SD = .12) at a greater rate than conflict problems (M = .33, 
SD = .15). For the overall RT test, there was no effect between nonconflict RTs and conflict 
RTs, F(2, 56) = 1.39, p = .26. Planned paired comparisons confirmed that RT differences 
between nonconflict problems and incorrect conflict decisions were approximately 450 ms, 
while RT differences between incorrect and correct conflict decisions were approximately 
380 ms. These values suggest that the Control group had trouble detecting the conflict on 
these problems, as well as that any additional time spent processing correct responses did not 
enter the realm of inhibition or decoupling. Though the accuracy test replicates Experiment 
2’s results, the overall RT test did not.  
Last, nonconflict and conflict problems were compared on complete-task FOR. There 
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was no difference between overall FOR, with nonconflict problems having only a slightly 
higher FOR (M = 5.40, SD = .98) than conflict problems (M = 5.33, SD = .97), t(28) = 1.40, p 
= .17. I will conduct the remainder of the statistical tests, but any conclusions drawn from 
this sub-sample will need to be weighed against conflicting findings. 
Next, pre-FB scores were tested on the three main DVs using the 4 (Group) x 2 
(Problem) ANOVAs to determine if group differences on the conditional reasoning task 
existed prior to any feedback manipulation. There was no difference between the groups on 
accuracy, F(3, 126) = 2.50, p = .06. There was a curious Problem effect, whereby each group 
had better accuracy on conflict problems (M = .58, SD = .15) than nonconflict problems (M 
= .52, SD = .13), F(1, 126) = 14.72, p < .001, η2p = .11. There was no interaction of these two 
variables, providing support for lack of group differences to proceed with additional 
hypothesis testing. There were no Group differences on pre-FB RT, F(3, 126) = .96, p = .41. 
There was also no Problem main or interaction with Group. Last, the Groups did not differ on 
pre-FB FOR, F(3, 126) = 1.24, p = .30. However, there was a Problem main effect, F(1, 126) 
= 13.17, p < .001, η2p = .10. Conflict problems engendered lower confidence ratings (M = 
5.09, SD = 1.21) than nonconflict confidence ratings (M = 5.26, SD = 1.19) for all groups. 
There was no Group by Problem interaction. These pretests suggest that the groups were 
more similar on this task than the base-rate task, so I will move on to the main analyses. 
Main analyses. The remaining analyses were conducted to test the main study 
hypotheses for the conditional reasoning task. To ensure comparability with the base-rate 
neglect task, the same main 4 (Group) x 2 (Problem) x 2 (Pre/Post-Feedback) ANCOVAs 
were conducted with accuracy, RT, and FOR as separate dependent measures. Pre-FB scores 
were entered into these statistical models as covariates to control for performance on these 
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measures before the main feedback manipulation. Table 11 shows the means and standard 
deviations for the various effects described below. 
Accuracy. The first test was conducted on accuracy of decisions on the task. With the 
adjustment of the covariate, there were no overall Group differences, F(3, 125) = .11, p = .95. 
Adjusted means were essentially slightly above chance. There was a marginal Problem 
effect, but the conflict problems still retained higher accuracy scores than nonconflict 
problems after the adjustment, F(1, 125) = 3.59, p = .06. There was a Feedback ME, F(1, 
125) = 65.46, p < .001, η2p = .34, but this effect was practically uninterpretable because the 
adjusted means were essentially the same values. The covariate of pre-FB accuracy was a 
significant predictor of the model, F(1, 125) = 233.95, p < .001, η2p = .65. It interacted with 
Problem and Feedback. It appeared that participants in all groups did not improve as they 
progressed through the task and especially after the feedback information was given. 
Interestingly, conflict problems maintained higher accuracy in all groups throughout, 
especially when accuracy was measured across problems as opposed to overall task accuracy. 
Response time. A similar story of effects on RT from the base-rate task is found here. 
Since there is an extensive practice effect on the first few problems carrying over to the 
remainder of the problem set, all groups get faster post-FB (F(1, 125) = 21.54, p < .001). 
With respect to the hypothesis that False-Low feedback would slow participants in this group 
relative to the other, it was not supported (the RTs are not the smallest rate reduction). 
Additionally, the False-High group did not increase in decision speed as a result of the 
feedback at the fastest rate (on both nonconflict and conflict problems, the Control group 
followed this trend, but the difference in RTs is not significant). 
FOR. On the conditional reasoning task, the Feedback manipulation appeared to 
 90 
 
modulate FOR as was intended by the manipulation. First, there is a Group main effect, F(3, 
125) = 2.92, p = .04, η2p = .07. The False-High group had the greater FOR ratings, while the 
False-Low group had the lowest FOR ratings. In addition, there is a Group by Feedback 
interaction, F(3, 125) = 3.02, p = .03, η2p = .07. Further analysis into these two effects shows 
that, as hypothesized, the False-High feedback group gained confidence across problems, and 
both the False-Low feedback and True feedback groups rated lower confidence post-FB. 
However, since these differences in confidence are very small, the trends as hypothesized are 
not statistically reliable. As a manipulation check in this analysis, the control group, which 
did not receive any feedback, did not change confidence ratings after their rest period 
halfway through the task. 
Conflict detection hypothesis. The prediction that conflict detection is efficient, 
routine, and universal (LIM) or a function of performance (TSM) was tested on the 
conditional reasoning task. Neither model was supported across Group, r(127) = .15, p = .09. 
The intercept for all participants was not different from zero and a negative value (-413 ms; 
t(128) = -0.88, p = .38), revealing that the majority of participants hovered near no RT 
difference of nonconflict RT and incorrect conflict RT. As shown in Figure 10, separating the 
groups revealed that only the False-Low feedback group had a significant positive 
relationship r(29) = .41, p < .05. The other three groups had unreliable correlations. In 
addition, the True feedback group’s trend was negative and the best performer in this group 
only achieved an accuracy score of approximately .50. 
Inhibition hypothesis. Overall, there was a negative relationship between conflict 
problem performance and RT differences between correct and incorrect judgments, but this 
correlation is not significant, r(127) = -.05, p = .55. The intercept to reflect the poorest 
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performance on the task was predicted to fall at less than one second—not enough to be 
different from zero in this regression model (977 ms, t(128) = 1.23. p = .22). Thus, this result 
reflects no clear case for inhibition across all participants. Separating the relationship by 
Group and the situation is extremely similar: none of the groups independently show 
inhibition (-.25 < rs < .15, ps > .05, see Figure 10). 
Cognitive decoupling hypothesis. As with Experiment 2, there was no relationship 
between conflict problem accuracy and the RT difference between correct conflict responses 
and nonconflict responses, r(127) = .04, p = .67. The intercept rested at 564 ms, again under 
the threshold for additional processing revealed in this series of studies and other work (e.g., 
Mevel et al., 2014; Pennycook et al., 2015). Separating participants by group to tests this 
relationship revealed that the False-Low feedback group had a significant positive 
relationship (r(29) = .42, p < .05, see Figure 10, Panel C), and the True feedback group had a 
significant negative relationship as predicted by the TSM (r(34) = -.38, p < .05, see Figure 
10, Panel D). 
Feedback interaction with detection, inhibition, and cognitive decoupling. Table 12 
shows the correlations of the three above indices with conflict problem performance before 
and after feedback. The majority of the correlations are not significant (flat), but the presence 
of feedback seems to change behavior patterns for participants. Notably, the relationship 
between the conflict detection index and conflict problem accuracy switched direction in the 
True feedback condition. In this group, Pre-FB, participants who made fewer errors showed a 
conflict detection effect (positive coefficient, TSM prediction supported); post-FB, however, 
participants in this group who in the end made fewer errors were faster and did not show the 
TSM-predicted positive slope. This makes sense: the feedback, however small (just a 
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percentage correct) allowed for faster responses after the rest period. Another explanation for 
this could be the practice effect that persists in all groups from the start of the task, which 
skews pre-FB RTs. 
Conflict detection and metacognitive FOR. There was no relationship between 
metacognitive FOR and the cognitive detection index, r(127) =.06, p = .50, contrary to the 
hypothesis that these would be conversely related measures. Separating by groups revealed 
similar lack of relationships between conflict detection and FOR. 
Results: Individual Differences and Time Series 
 Individual differences. Correlations between the performance variables discussed 
extensively and CRT, SAT, and NFC measures were conducted. As with Experiment 2, CRT 
scores correlated positively with SAT scores, r(90) = .22, p = .04. However, CRT scores did 
not correlate with NFC scores. Performance on the CRT was correlated with conditional 
nonconflict reasoning accuracy, r(128) = .23, p = .007. There were no other correlations 
present in the combined sample. Correlations were also computed by separating out 
Feedback Group. In the Control group, there were no notable or reliable correlations. In the 
False-High feedback group, CRT performance was positively correlated with conflict 
problem accuracy on the base-rate neglect task, r(32) = .42, p = .04. In the False-Low 
feedback group and the True feedback group, there were no reliable relationships between 
the measures and performance on either task. 
 The median split analyses from the previous two experiments were not conducted on 
this dataset due to the complexity of the design and the sample sizes for each Feedback 
group. It is reasonable to argue that the indices described above can differentiate bias-
susceptible individuals from bias-resistant individuals. Bias-susceptible individuals appear to 
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err as a result of monitoring failures, while bias-resistant individuals appear detect conflict 
and choose the correct answer (decoupling).  
Time series analysis. The same time series regressions from Experiments 1 and 2 
were conducted for the two tasks in Experiment 3, with special attention paid to the feedback 
groups. Each regression analysis was conducted separately for the first half (before feedback) 
and the second half (after feedback) of each group. 
 Base-rate neglect. There was a large visible difference between conflict and 
nonconflict problems over time. This is the case for all the groups over the 50 problems. 
However, there were no noticeable differences between the trends by group. Prior to 
feedback, all groups had a declining trend on conflict problems. After feedback was 
presented, accuracy trends increased in all groups, with the sharpest (non-significant) change 
in the False-High group. However, this increase was larger than the trend for the False-Low 
feedback group. All groups had non-significant declining trends in FOR pre- and post-FB. 
The regression line for the False-Low group was constantly the lowest among all the groups. 
Again, the range was severely restricted on FOR ratings. RTs were not analyzed due to a 
consistent (across experiments) practice effect. There is nothing useful to glean from these 
trends. 
 Conditional reasoning. The conditional reasoning task, as I have described 
throughout Experiment 2 and this experiment, did not have the same robust dichotomy 
between conflict and nonconflict problems, because the problem types increase in their 
overall variability across time. It was difficult to decipher the trends on accuracy before and 
after feedback. The regression analyses did not reveal any effects. The FOR trend did show 
the mounting problem of the measurement of confidence through a 7-point Likert scale, 
 94 
 
however. Large-scale effects were not present with very little change over time, which was 
more evidence that people tended to take each problem individually. Again, no RT time 
series were conducted using this method as all participants tended to speed up and large-scale 
trends would be influenced heavily by this. 
Strategy change question. After the participants completed both tasks, they were 
asked if they had changed their strategy based on the feedback given. Participants also stated 
the strategies that they used. The Control group was only asked which strategy was used. 
Overwhelmingly, strategies included using stereotypes and probability on the base-rate task, 
whereas on the conditional reasoning task, participants suggested they relied upon logic or 
intuition (a synonym for believability, perhaps). 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test Group on whether the participant changed 
their strategy after feedback was presented.11 While the average for the False-High feedback 
group was the smallest (M = .30, SD = .47), there were no differences between the amount of 
participants who adopted a new strategy, F(2, 96) = 1.29, p = .28. Fewer participants in the 
False-Low feedback switched strategies (M = .45, SD = .51) than those in the True feedback 
(M = .49, SD = .51). Post-hoc comparisons corroborated the overall null effect. While a 
smaller proportion of participants in the False-High feedback group switched their strategy 
after feedback (less than one-third), not enough participants in the other two feedback groups 
switched strategies to show a distinct effect of the feedback manipulation. However, it is a 
promising trend. 
                                                
11 This test included 99 participants because the control group was not included. They did not 
receive feedback and were not asked about whether they changed their strategy. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 3 was designed to examine the impact of feedback on the failure 
hypotheses discussed in DPTs (storage, monitoring, and inhibition failures, De Neys & 
Bonnefon, 2013). The central question was whether feedback interacted with these bias 
descriptions. For example, if answer fluency and FOR impacted subsequent T2 engagement, 
then utilizing a feedback manipulation designed to specifically address a person’s sense of 
confidence in performance should work to modulate the instantiation of a monitoring failure. 
A monitoring failure as described by Thompson and colleagues (Thompson, 2009; 
Thompson et al., 2011) is the failure of a metacognitive feeling. A monitoring failure as 
described by De Neys and Bonnefon (2013) is the failure to recognize that the situation 
requires formalized knowledge; Pennycook et al.’s (2015) TSM takes this further by defining 
a monitoring failure as simply a failure of conflict detection. If one assumes that the FOR and 
behavioral conflict detection (by RT) are related or converging measures of the same 
cognitive attribute, then a manipulation through feedback should hope to extinguish this bias. 
Three groups in this experiment received some form of feedback, while a control group acted 
as a baseline. One group received feedback intended to bolster confidence (False-High), 
another group received feedback intended to reduce confidence (False-Low), and final 
feedback group received feedback intended to reflect actual performance (biased decisions 
prior to feedback would dictate the effect of feedback; True feedback group). These groups 
were inserted into Experiment 2’s procedure where participants completed the base-rate 
neglect and the conditional reasoning tasks. 
Base-rate neglect. On the base-rate neglect task, overall accuracy effects replicated, 
but RT and FOR effects were difficult to parse. Overall, the feedback group manipulation did 
 96 
 
very little interacting with the robust existing effects (replicated in the Control group) on the 
base-rate tasks. There were promising trends in the False-Low group with respect to FOR: 
this group has the lowest rated FOR after feedback was introduced. The inferred T2 
engagement was not reflected in RT slowing or increased accuracy versus the other 3 groups, 
however. 
With respect to the model predictions on behavioral individual differences, there was 
added support for the TSM (Pennycook et al., 2015) overall and within each group. Thus, 
participants who made the fewest errors in each group spent more time detecting conflict 
than people who made the most errors. This is similarly the case in Experiments 1 and 2. The 
inhibition prediction of the LIM was not supported (De Neys, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). Last, the 
TSM postulation of decoupling for the most-biased participants was supported: they spent 
more time working out correct responses than participants who made the fewest errors. These 
three indices did not interact with the feedback manipulation, however (there were no 
significant relationship changes for any group). 
Conditional reasoning. On the conditional reasoning task, two interesting results 
were observed. Though there was an accuracy effect of feedback, I would hazard to say that 
there is no practical difference across groups before and after feedback was given, as the 
adjusted means were only .007 units apart. The likely issue here was that the combination of 
nonconflict and conflict problems were less clear than in Experiment 2. The second 
interesting effect was that there was a Group by Feedback interaction on FOR ratings. These 
ratings decreased in the False-Low and True feedback groups after feedback, but increased in 
the False-High feedback group. As with the base-rate task, this effect offered a glimmer of a 
trend, but accuracy and RT measures were not differentially impacted as predicted. 
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The behavioral indices on this task were as muddied here as in Experiment 2; overall 
there was no support for either the TSM or LIM. There were no clear patterns to interpret 
averaging across feedback groups or for the individual feedback groups. 
Additional considerations. First, response times were difficult to analyze directly 
within the main ANCOVAs on both tasks. Time series analyses show a large decrease in RTs 
across trials. Pre-FB RT averages were always slower than post-FB averages. The lack of 
training problems prior to the main task imparted a significant practice effect that persisted in 
all groups and across each of the experiments. In this case, coupled with the restricted range 
of the recorded FOR ratings, inferring T2 engagement in this overall study is premature. 
Second, Experiment 3 added to the evidence that the LIM (De Neys, 2012, 2014a, 
2014b) is not sophisticated enough to account for individual differences in response times 
and behavior. It is clear that monitoring failures defined as errors of conflict detection are 
more predictive of a person’s ability to do reasoning/judgment tasks than inhibition failures. 
Though the data were inconclusive, the TSM (Pennycook et al., 2015) model was primarily 
supported. Additionally, Experiment 3 added to the conclusions of Experiment 2 that both 
models cannot account for the tasks that extend beyond the social inference heuristics of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973), such as conditional reasoning task. Conditional reasoning 
requires some formalized knowledge in addition to some logical intuitions (modus ponens) 
that social inferences rarely need (if the heuristic is strong enough). The base-rate neglect 
task used here is qualitatively distinct from the conditional reasoning task used here, and the 
data in this series of experiments support this distinction. The models (LIM, TSM) are task-
specific to base-rate neglect.  
  
 98 
 
Chapter V. 
General Discussion 
 The central question of the present dissertation was source of errors people make on 
reasoning and judgment decisions and whether people know that they are biased. It addressed 
this question by investigating three major pieces within a Dual Process Theories framework, 
namely (1) the role the conflict detection and monitoring mechanism, as described by De 
Neys (2012, 2014a) in the LIM, and as described by Pennycook et al. (2015) in the TSM; (2) 
the scope of these models and if predictions can be applied to different tasks than those from 
which they were developed; (3) and whether the cognitive failures could be mitigated by 
offering a feedback intervention. 
Theoretical Implications: Conflict Detection and Resolution 
Conflict detection and eventual resolution (whether achieving the “correct” or 
“incorrect” answer to a given judgment or reasoning problem) is an essential function of any 
dual process framework (De Neys, 2012, 2014a, De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Evans, 2007, 
2009; Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2015) because it identifies how and when a 
person would utilize T1 responses over T2 responses, or vice versa. Early processing models 
(serial and parallel) failed to account for how conflict was handled by the two processing 
types (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996), which has 
engendered criticism to the overall dual process framework (e.g., Keren, 2013; Kruglanski & 
Gigerenzer, 2011). Moreover, a specific description of the conflict mechanism is required to 
support the case of dual processing vs. unimodal or continuum processing (Osman, 2004). 
Two recent models of conflict detection within DPT have garnered considerable attention 
(De Neys, 2014a). The LIM postulates that conflict detection is a universal trait, routinely 
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utilized, and efficient/quick (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, 2012). The TSM 
postulated that detection was not universal, an individual difference, but for those who utilize 
it, can be quite quick (Pennycook et al., 2015). Using the description of biases by De Neys 
and Bonnefon (2013), the LIM claimed that errors were the result of inhibition failures; the 
TSM claimed errors were due to monitoring failures. 
Monitoring or inhibition failures? The results from three related experiments are 
possibly consistent with the TSM, but there are a number of qualifications that must be made. 
Overall, conflict detection was faulty for those participants who tended to make many biased 
responses. The group averages promoted an overall conflict detection effect, but once 
individuals were compared against this group effect, it was clear that monitoring failures, and 
not inhibition failures, were the cause of this bias. The LIM’s postulation that conflict 
detection should be a flat relationship with a positive intercept was not supported. In terms of 
T1 and T2 processing, the line drawn between the two is clear and the TSM is better suited to 
account for the present data. According to the TSM, in Stage 1 of the thinking processing, a 
reasoner utilizes T1 processing—the initial responses are generated based on intuition 
(Evans, 2007), feelings of rightness (discussed in more detail below; Thompson, 2009), 
answer fluency (Thompson et al., 2011), or in response to cognitive load (De Neys, 2006) or 
time pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005), and generated rapidly (in milliseconds). If 
there is no conflict between various initial responses, such as when a base-rate problem cues 
the same answer from both the actual numbers and the stereotypic information, decisions 
generally proceed within milliseconds from the generation of responses. This is a good 
baseline for all responses, but particularly for assessing the engagement of T2. Now, in the 
case of conflict in the initial responses, a resolution must be made. In this simplified 
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dichotomy of responses, the heuristic response is at odds with the probabilistic/normative 
response. The conflict monitoring mechanism reflects additional processing. This additional 
processing, whether a person decides to choose the heuristic response or the normative 
response, is a reflection of T2 engagement (Pennycook et al., 2015). What T2 does in the 
moments after the conflict is initially detected is identified by models as inhibition/inhibition 
failure (LIM) or cognitive decoupling/rationalization (TSM). 
 Though the TSM does not specifically address inhibition failure (it was classified as 
part of a cognitive decoupling process), the results across studies are inconsistent with an 
LIM perspective that describes the function of T2 as an inhibitor. The negative correlation 
between inhibition RTs and conflict problem accuracy indicated that the fewer errors made 
on these problems generally led to quicker responses. Thus, the better performers on the two 
thinking tasks generally spent less time making correct responses than making incorrect 
responses. It makes sense that the participants who made the most errors had to inhibit the 
incorrect response on a limited number of trials, but the LIM would predict that the inhibition 
processing times ultimately increase as a person makes more correct decisions, as T2 
becomes an active inhibitor, which would result in a positive slope for this relationship. The 
LIM is not sophisticated enough to readily explain the data; however, conceptual pieces of 
the model are not lost in the later formulation of the TSM. 
The final piece to the biases question is the predictive power of the indices to classify 
individuals based on their conflict problem performance. First, performing a median split on 
conflict problem accuracy averages created two groups. Below-median individuals were 
classified in the bias-susceptible group and above-median individuals were classified in the 
bias-resistant group. Using conflict accuracy was by far the best classifier; however, this is 
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unsurprising. This does not solve the issue as the main source of errors on these reasoning 
and judgment tasks. Using the conflict detection index and the inhibition index as the sole 
predictors, a discriminant function analysis was conducted on all datasets and tasks. Across 
all experiments, the conflict detection index was the stronger predictor between the two, 
especially on the base-rate neglect task. Based on just these two predictors, and primarily the 
detection index, participants were correctly classified in the bias-susceptible and bias-
resistant groups greater than 53% of the time in Experiments 1 and 2 (this lower bound was 
the conditional reasoning task of Experiment 2). RT differences between nonconflict baseline 
and incorrect conflict responses (conflict detection index) identified group placement better 
than the RT difference between correct and incorrect conflict responses (inhibition index). 
This represents further evidence to support monitoring failures as the major source of bias 
across tasks (De Neys, 2014a; Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2015). 
Though monitoring failures are the observed source of errors across the base-rate 
experiments, and somewhat on the conditional reasoning task, inhibition failures cannot be 
ruled out as a potential source for some people. De Neys (2012, 2014a) does not label what 
an inhibition failure may involve, judging it as a merely a failure of the structure of the 
RLPFC (De Neys et al., 2008) to stop a compelling, strong initial response (Botvinick et al., 
2004). Pennycook and colleagues lump inhibition failures into decoupling failures 
(Pennycook et al., 2015). Whether these failures are a product of rationalization is still 
unknown, though verbal protocols might be able to detect this specific distinction (such as 
the methodology of De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). In a two-alternative forced-choice 
paradigm, a person is either correct or incorrect, which leaves little room for interpretation of 
a mechanical failure (inhibition) vs. a psychological failure (rationalization). The results of 
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these studies did not support the cognitive decoupling hypothesis, per se, but showed that 
bias-resistant individuals sometimes make mistakes. In fact, it seemed from these results that 
a positive decoupling relationship makes more sense than a negative relationship, because if 
a person is spending more processing time to detect conflict, then they should take additional 
time to decouple, thus increasing time above a baseline (which is what is predicted by the 
inhibition index account of the LIM). Whether this leads to a correct or incorrect answer 
depends entirely on the definition of decoupling, which broadly defined, would include 
rationalization (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Taken together, inhibition failures may just be 
rationalizations to choose the compelling initial response. This explains those bias-resistant 
individuals on both tasks making the occasional errors. 
Storage failures? While it is entirely plausible that some people have storage failures 
(Stanovich, 2009)—they do not have the requisite knowledge to perform validity 
evaluations—it is difficult to determine that this source of error is behaviorally distinct from 
monitoring failures. Both types of failures are marked by low accuracy and fast response 
times on nonconflict and conflict problems. The dimension that might separate people into 
one failure source or the other on a given task would be confidence/FOR, or the factor that 
would show that they do not know that they are making decisions in a biased way. To know 
if this is true, a storage failure may be marked by low confidence (an answer of this nature 
should be “Guessing” [1] on the scale used in these experiments). According to the 
metacognitive monitoring theory (Thompson, 2009; Thompson et al., 2011), this low 
confidence should signal T2 engagement. However, in this case, T2 would not engage on 
these problems because there is nothing to analyze, because there is no formal knowledge to 
retrieve and evaluate. Conversely, a monitoring failure might be marked with a high FOR—
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no detection that the problem or situation requires T2 engagement, but confidence of the 
initial response. Conceptually, it makes sense to divide behavioral responses in this way. 
However, the data presented here do not support this distinction. Storage failures were not 
observed here: incorrect response FOR was not correlated with RT on those responses for 
conflict base-rate problems (r = .01) and this was similar for incorrect nonconflict problem 
RT and FOR (r = .05). This is not surprising, as the base-rate neglect task does not 
necessarily lend itself to a storage failure explanation. However, on the conditional reasoning 
task, where the explanation is plausible for errors, a similar case is observed: incorrect RTs 
on both nonconflict and conflict problems were not correlated with the respective FOR 
values (they were actually negatively correlated, rs = -.08). Thus, I am confident that the 
monitoring of the conflict detection mechanism is the weak link for the majority of 
individuals in in the cognitive framework of dual processing routes. 
FOR. Metacognitive FOR (Thompson, 2009; Thompson et al., 2011) offered an 
additional perspective and measure to determine the role of T2 engagement in both the base-
rate neglect task and conditional reasoning task. It was a self-report measure of confidence 
that participants would record following each question they encountered. In Experiment 2, 
the role of FOR was mixed. At the group level, problem type and response interacted to 
produce FOR effects on both tasks. This suggested that the nature of the problems, whether 
they were nonconflict or conflict, changed the way participants evaluated their confidence in 
their answers. This sounds like strong support for the measure and the conceptual link that 
low FOR signals the need for T2 engagement or that high FOR does not signal this 
engagement. However, the remainder of the findings muddies these conclusions. As a 
covariate, it did not affect RTs on either task. This is likely due to the temporal ordering of 
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measurement whereby the response followed by the confidence rating was not sophisticated 
enough to capture the milliseconds worth of processing. This ordering could have also led to 
a minor hindsight bias or response fence-sitting. Further evaluation of the confidence scale 
will be addressed in a later section of limitations. As a converging measure of T2 
engagement with conflict monitoring postulated by the TSM, there were weak correlations. 
Conceptually, FOR should have a negative relationship with conflict monitoring: high FOR 
should reduce the need for conflict monitoring, and errors should be relatively fast with a 
high confidence rating. Conversely, low FOR should signal greater monitoring within the 
individual, increasing RT from baseline and possibly leading to a correct answer (see 
Thompson & Johnson, 2014). 
In Experiment 3, a manipulation of FOR was attempted. If the presence of feedback 
interacted with FOR, which in turn would interact with accuracy and RTs, then large group 
differences should be observed. This was not the case in this experiment. There were trends 
that appeared, which suggest some methodological considerations, such as measurement of 
FOR or problem presentation changes for increased power. Though these are minor findings 
to support the overall impact of FOR in DPT, they should not be disregarded completely. It is 
clear more work is needed with stronger methodology. Future research should also address if 
FOR can be untangled from the neurophysiological evidence on conflict detection, perhaps 
utilizing the rethinking methodology of Thompson et al. (2011). 
Task-specific or task-general models? Both the LIM and TSM were developed 
using the base-rate neglect task (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), 
which has shown robust accuracy (choosing the base-rate answer) effects for decades (e.g., 
De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook et al., 2012). Robust RT effects have been shown for 
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almost a decade when utilizing extreme base rates (e.g., 997 vs. 3; De Neys & Glumicic, 
2008). It was important for these two models to be tested outside of base-rate neglect, on 
something other than a problem that invokes a social inference (even conjunction fallacy 
problems fall under this category; De Neys, 2014b). In recent DPT investigations, 
conditional reasoning has been used (Thompson et al., 2011), as well as denominator 
neglect/ratio bias (Mevel et al., 2015; Thompson & Johnson, 2014) and categorical 
syllogistic reasoning (De Neys & Franssens, 2009; Thompson & Johnson, 2014). Conditional 
reasoning was a reasonable choice from these tasks for replication and extension purposes. 
Conditional reasoning, especially inferences about definitional or causal rules, does not 
involve making inferences about people, merely the connection between objects or outcomes, 
and is therefore qualitatively distinct from base-rate neglect. Furthermore, though general 
explanations of DPTs were developed in syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Evans et al., 1983) or 
other reasoning tasks, the two models were created with base-rate neglect, and so their 
specific predictions have not been evaluated by other researchers or tasks in the extant 
literature since the models’ development. 
 Experiments 2 and 3 contained both the base-rate neglect and conditional reasoning 
tasks for a direct comparison with the same participants. Perhaps the only finding that carries 
through both tasks is that monitoring failures are the likely cause of bias, but even this effect 
is unclear across tasks, i.e., the conditional reasoning task. RT differences were extremely 
close on the conditional reasoning task, which do not match the larger effects observed on the 
base-rate neglect task. The data support the conclusion that the LIM cannot describe the 
observed patterns of behavior. Additionally, I am reticent to suggest that the TSM applies 
across tasks because the effects are extremely weak on the conditional reasoning task. It may 
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actually be the case that bias on this task reflects storage failures (Stanovich, 2009) than 
monitoring failures, which is something that the TSM cannot parse in behavioral responses. 
 Experiment 3 further exacerbated the distinction between the two tasks. The feedback 
manipulation was stronger on the conditional reasoning task, which ultimately showed the 
glimmer of support for manipulating confidence in dual process methodology. Feedback 
minimally impacted the base-rate neglect task. Overall, responses on conditional reasoning 
problems reflected different processing that could not be accounted for by the two models 
tested in this dissertation that were readily available for base-rate responses. 
 I do not suggest that these DPTs are incompatible with conditional reasoning. The 
conclusion I draw from these data and this series of studies is that the conflict detection and 
monitoring models developed within base-rate neglect do not transfer to a qualitatively 
different task. I suggest that these models are task-specific. Further tuning is necessary to 
encapsulate the spectrum of reasoning tasks into a dual process framework. 
Thinking dispositions, cognitive ability, and conflict detection. What do the results 
suggest for the inclusion of thinking dispositions or cognitive ability in identifying individual 
differences? This dissertation has some promising findings to add to the discussion of 
cognitive engagement with these tasks (Evans, 2007); Experiment 1 had typical correlations 
between performance on the base-rate neglect task and the CRT (Frederick, 2005), the AOT 
(Stanovich & West, 1997), and NFC (Cacioppo et al., 1984; see Swan & Revlin, 2015, for a 
review). However, with the exclusion of the AOT in Experiments 2 and 3, very little could be 
gleaned from thinking dispositions and the relationship with task performance and cognitive 
traits. The strong correlations from the first experiment disappeared in these two samples. 
There were some correlations between the RT indices and disposition and ability that were 
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interesting: positive relationships for conflict detection and NFC and CRT scores in 
Experiment 1 (rs > .31, ps < .01), suggesting that as a participant was more interested in 
complex cognitive activities (NFC) or more reflective in the face of intuitive answers (CRT), 
more time was spent on detection of conflict across problems. In addition, there was a small 
positive correlation of the conflict detection index with cognitive ability (SAT scores), 
suggesting that people with a stronger ability to perform well actually did do well and made 
fewer monitoring errors (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). 
Some of these effects disappear in Experiment 2. While NFC scores are positively 
related to conflict detection on the conditional reasoning task, they are not on the base-rate 
task, contrary to Experiment 1. SAT scores predict conflict detection on the base-rate task but 
not on the conditional reasoning task—further evidence that these two tasks are distinct. 
Similar effects appear in Experiment 3. 
These mixed findings show the lack of clarity with these reasoning and judgments 
task as and the role of cognitive ability and thinking disposition. It might be the case that 
SAT scores are not a good indicator of ability, as previous literature maintained (Stanovich & 
West, 2000), and that thinking dispositions are too variable (Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2014) and 
need further validation (self-report measures may generally have this issue). Further research 
is needed to full incorporate and address these individual difference measures into the failure 
individual differences discussed here. 
Three-Stages Model Modifications 
In an effort to refine conflict detection models and integrate them with the data and 
results explored here, I offer some important changes to the TSM model (Pennycook et al., 
2015) for further exploration in future research. As Figure 11 illustrates, T1 and T2 
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processing remain serialized. The observable response outputs from the two processing 
routes remain quantifiably distinct. The line at the bottom of the Figure represents time and 
its progression through the three stages. The three stages are marked within the T1 and T2 
processing routes. First, once a problem or situation is presented, initial responses are 
generated based on FOR, fluency, or other indicators (Thompson et al., 2011). In the tasks 
used frequently by various researchers (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook et al., 
2012; Pennycook et al., 2015; Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Thompson et al., 2011) all 
problems have the potential to generate multiple responses. I have used the LIM’s structure 
by limiting this to two intuitive responses (De Neys, 2012): an initial response of a heuristic 
intuition (IRH) or an initial response of a logical or probabilistic intuition (IRL). 
The major change I make to the model is to explicitly include the conflict monitoring 
stage (Stage 2) in T2 and not within T1 (this delineation is not clear in the original TSM, see 
Figure 2). There is an important distinction in this stage regarding the timing of conflict 
detection. I argue that based on the data collected in three separate experiments, conflict 
detection is a gradual sub-process of T2 that takes longer than milliseconds, in contrast with 
how the timing is described in TSM. However, if there is no conflict present or detected, 
initial saliency-based responses still do occur within milliseconds after completing the initial 
reading of the problem. This accounts for nonconflict responses and undetected, incorrect 
conflict responses (IRH), especially on both tasks but maintains these decisions as functions 
of T2. This is because working memory will contain the decision made and a person can 
report exactly what decision they have made (Evans, 2009; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). In 
addition, the response output from an undetected conflict in a two-alternatives problem could 
be a correct answer (IRL). As particularly evidenced by a number of participants (44% of the 
 109 
 
sample) on the conditional reasoning task in Experiment 2, many correct responses were 
actually made quicker than the nonconflict baseline (decoupling index), which could be 
accounted for by labeling these responses to either a saliency-based strategy, such as the 
structure of the argument was more apparent than the necessity/sufficiency of the conditional 
rule, or just basic guessing. The original TSM fails to incorporate responses that reflect this 
possibility (Pennycook et al., 2015). 
On problems where the two responses conflict, once conflict is detected between IRH 
and IRL, T2 must now continue to a decision between the two alternatives. This initiates 
Stage 3, under my umbrella term of cognitive decoupling. This defining feature of cognitive 
decoupling (Evans & Stanovich, 2013) leads to a correct or incorrect answer through 
working memory deliberation. A correct answer is interpreted as a normalization (use of 
normative logic) or inhibition of the IRH, which leads to the selection of IRL. An incorrect 
answer reflects rationalization (as described by Pennycook et al., 2015), whereby both 
answers were weighed by T2, but ultimately confidence or other factors indicate a preference 
for IRH. The relative distance between the rationalization response and the normalization 
response support the idea that incorrect answers on conflict problems do tend to take longer 
than correct, normalized answers. The bias-resistant participants who tended to spend much 
deliberation on incorrect answers on both tasks support this latter explanation. 
With the TSM model expressed in this modified way, one can clearly identify the bias 
divergences described De Neys and Bonnefon (2013). First, if a person suffers from storage 
failures, the path to a quick decision is generally through the IRH path in the model. If 
conflict monitoring is the source of errors, bias-susceptible individuals are separated very 
early from bias-resistant individuals (across problems), and guessing can be determined by 
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examining the detection index vs. the decoupling index for correct answers (such as if the 
decoupling index value is below the nonconflict baseline and accuracy is low, this is likely a 
guessing situation) Further divergence can occur after conflict is detected within bias-
resistant individuals: normalizers/inhibitors (participants who tend to get problems mostly 
correct) or rationalizers (who get more incorrect than normalizers and might be more bias-
susceptible). The important thing to remember with the original TSM and this modified 
model is that it exists on a problem-to-problem basis, where a person of any description 
could come to a correct or incorrect decision at any time. This ultimately becomes the 
limiting factor of the model: there are only two alternatives. 
The purpose of these modifications was not to discount the TSM completely, but to 
allow it stronger explanatory power for the present data. However, these modifications need 
further examination in the base-rate neglect task and the conditional reasoning task, as well 
as other social inference tasks (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) and traditional reasoning tasks, 
such as linear reasoning or categorical syllogistic reasoning. It is possible that further tuning 
is required. Incorporation of these modifications into similar methodologies is also warranted 
investigation, especially with the methodological limitations described in the next section. 
Limitations 
Many of the above conclusions and evaluation of the theoretical implications need to 
be qualified within some limitations that may have influenced the observed results. First, 
while there were some promising FOR effects, it is appropriate to mention the 
methodological issues with the scale used to gather FOR ratings. I do not challenge the 
effects observed on this scale; they replicate the differences that Thompson et al. (2011) and 
Thompson and Johnson (2014) observed and were later used in theoretical justifications for 
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the measure. However, this does not absolve it from critical analysis. For example, a scalar 
difference of .20 between nonconflict and conflict problems (Thompson et al., 2011, p. 123) 
is hardly descriptive in practical terms. What do these intra-scale values actually represent 
(even when they are averaged across multiple trials)? It might have to do with the 
interpretation of the anchors on the scale. Included with the numbers are three verbal 
anchors, with two for the endpoints and one for the midpoint. The high endpoint reads 
“Certain I’m Right”, while the low endpoint reads “I’m Guessing” (Thompson et al., 2011). 
The remainder of the scale reflects gradations between guessing and certainty. However, the 
midpoint represents the problem; it reads “Fairly Certain”. The scale was slightly modified in 
Thompson and Johnson (2014) whereby “I’m Guessing” was changed to “Doesn’t Feel Right 
at All” to better reflect the “feeling” part of FOR. However, this change did little to 
dynamically change responses on the scale and small mean differences were observed across 
tasks (Thompson & Johnson, 2014). Moreover, the time series analyses in Experiments 2 and 
3 show that the majority of participants, on average, were generally more confident in their 
answers than “fairly certain”. However, it is reasonable to suggest that the interpretation of 
the midpoint is open and malleable. In principle, that does not disqualify the scale or the 
verbal anchors, but it does call into question the responses when behavioral measures 
indicate guessing. Additionally, the resultant restricted range has consequences for FOR’s 
relationship with the other variables in question. Conclusions drawn from this scale should be 
taken and made with caution. Future research of metacognitive FOR would benefit from a 
methodological shift from this scale of confidence to a more reliable and validated measure 
of confidence (or utilize a collection of measures). 
A related limitation to the FOR/confidence scale was its placement within the general 
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procedure. While participants were answering the questions within each task, their 
metacognitive sense of confidence was always post hoc to the behavior of generating the 
answer. Some people may have had difficulty introspecting in this way. This necessary 
ordering issue may have impacted ratings of confidence, but reviewing response times for 
confidence ratings show that the majority of responses on the scale for each problem within a 
task were usually less than a second—the initial response to the question was weighed 
heavily, reflecting the theorized implicit mechanisms of FOR, but the selection of the 
confidence rating did not generally receive much deliberation or introspection. If the latter is 
the case, then the limitations discussed in the previous paragraph are far more important for 
interpretation of the concept of FOR. 
 The other methodological limitation to this dissertation reflects an oversight in 
Experiment 3’s design. In the general design, random assignment was used to prevent 
confounds in the between-subjects group variable, and complete randomization was used for 
the individual problems within each task to prevent order effects within the tasks (problem 
ordering), but the two tasks were not counterbalanced to control for large-scale carryover 
effects from the first task to the second. This control limitation is especially important in the 
two false feedback conditions (False-High and False-Low groups), where the participants 
were told essentially the same information for both tasks. For each participant, the base-rate 
neglect task always came first, rather than half receiving the conditional reasoning task first. 
Feedback on the base-rate task may have affected performance in the pre-FB portion of the 
conditional reasoning task. This may have initiated a feeling of failure or overconfidence 
before the second task began. This is a possible confound within the results of the conditional 
reasoning task. However, if the effects were truly damaging to the overall interpretation of 
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the findings, there would likely be anomalies in the Feedback groups vs. the Control group, 
since the latter did not receive feedback and would therefore not reflect any problem with 
task carryover. This is not the case in the data, as the pre-FB analysis did not reveal group 
differences. Though the data may or may not support a carryover effect, it cannot be ruled 
out because I cannot compare participants who received different tasks first and test for the 
null effect (no differences). 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the general question related to 
whether people know they are biased, how errors manifest on classic reasoning and judgment 
tasks, and importantly, if DPT models are task-general explanation for cognitions and 
behaviors. First, despite the limitations outlined above, it is clear that conflict detection and 
resolution is an individual difference, as postulated by the TSM. Conflict monitoring is 
essential for detecting multiple cued responses by a given problem, context, or situation. It is 
also not equally efficient in all folks who have active monitoring mechanisms. The link 
between metacognitive Feelings of Rightness is fuzzy, but with some methodological 
changes, future investigation could be a promising endeavor. 
Second, some models developed within a given task suffer from difficult boundaries. 
The two recent models described herein represent such a case: the complexity and qualitative 
differences of conditional reasoning at best reflect observationally different processing from 
base-rate neglect. The modifications to the TSM attempt to address these processing 
idiosyncrasies and future studies are planned to incorporate these new predictions. 
While it is not the intention of this manuscript to speak directly to the general 
criticisms of DPTs, it is somewhat clear that these theories may be handy or nifty 
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explanations of cognitions, as many dichotomies share, but that they may ultimately be too 
simplistic to capture the range of cognitions and entirety of the vast cognitive architecture. 
This pause may not be at the level of some researchers’ opinions (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2009; 
Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011), but it should signal to DPT researchers to consider efforts 
for over-simplification. 
It is, however, safe to assume that humans may be biased and poor reasoners because 
their cognitive architecture is designed for efficiency, and this so happens to prevent many 
from even recognizing that they are biased. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
List of Acronyms Appearing in Manuscript 
Acronym Full Term 
DPT Dual Process Theories 
JDM Judgment and Decision-Making 
ACC Anterior cingulate cortex 
RLPFC Right lateral prefrontal cortex 
LIM Logical Intuition Model 
TSM Three-stages Model 
FOR Feeling of Rightness 
CRT Cognitive Reflection Test 
NFC Need for Cognition 
AOT Active Open-minded Thinking 
MP Modus Ponens 
MT Modus Tollens 
AC Affirming the Consequent 
DA Denying the Antecedent 
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Table 2 
Clusters of Attributes Associated with Dual-Process Theories for Each Processing Type 
Clusters Type 1 Type 2 
1. Consciousness Unconscious (preconscious) Conscious 
 
Implicit Explicit 
Automatic Controlled 
Low effort High effort 
Rapid Slow 
Low capacity High Capacity 
Default process Inhibitory 
Holistic, perceptual Analytic, reflective 
2. Evolutionary Old Recent 
 
Evolutionary rationality Individual rationality 
Shared with animals Uniquely human 
Nonverbal Linked to language 
Modular cognition Fluid intelligence 
3. Functional 
Characteristics Associative Rule-based 
 
Domain-specific Domain-general 
Contextualized Abstract 
Pragmatic Logical 
Parallel Sequential 
Stereotypical Egalitarian 
4. Individual Differences Universal Heritable 
 
Indp. of general 
intelligence  Linked to general intelligence 
Indp. of working 
memory 
Limited by working memory 
capacity 
Note. Table adapted from Evans (2008).  
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Table 3 
Predicted Correlations Between the Three Indices and Conflict Problem Accuracy for 
Each Dual Process Model 
  Model 
Index LIM (De Neys, 2012) TSM (Pennycook et al., 2015) 
Conflict Detection 
Flat, r = 0; intercept > 0 positive slope, r > 0; intercept ≤ 0 (incorrect conflict RT - 
nonconflict RT) 
  
Inhibition positive slope, r > 0; 
intercept ≥ 0 No specific prediction (correct conflict RT - incorrect 
conflict RT) 
  
Cognitive Decoupling 
No specific prediction negative slope, r < 0; intercept ≥ 0 (correct conflict RT - nonconflict 
RT) 
Note. LIM = Logical Intuition Model; TSM = Three-stages Model; RT = Response time.  
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Table 4             
Mean (SD) Accuracy (Proportion of Base-rate Responses) and Response Times (s) 
in Experiment 1 
  Accuracy Response Time 
Problem Type M (SD) M (SD) 
Nonconflict .90 (.08) 11.6 (3.04) 
 
Conflict .48 (.30)  
Incorrect Responses  14.3 (4.91) 
Correct Responses  14.5 (5.21) 
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Table 6 
Mean (SD) Response Times (s) by Problem Type for Bias-Susceptible and Bias Resistant 
Groups in Experiment 1 
  Bias-Susceptible Group Bias-Resistant Group 
Problem Type n = 44 n = 23 
Nonconflict   
  Incorrect 13.5 (5.52) 15.9 (5.69) 
  Correct 11.2 (2.65) 11.8 (4.11) 
  
Conflict   
  Incorrect 11.9 (2.99) 17.3 (5.27) 
  Correct 14.4 (5.58) 14.4 (5.01) 
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Table 7 
Mean (SD) Accuracy and Response Times (s) on the Base-rate Neglect and Conditional 
Reasoning Tasks in Experiment 2 
  Base-rate Neglect Task   Conditional Reasoning Task 
  Accuracy Response Time   Accuracy Response Time 
Problem Type n = 102 n = 93   n = 102 n = 102 
Nonconflict .90 (.11) 13.1 (3.47)   .77 (.12) 8.1 (2.37) 
  
Conflict .45 (.27)     .40 (.15)   
  Incorrect   14.4 (4.00)   7.9 (2.45) 
  Correct   16.4 (5.07)   8.8 (3.46) 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. The different theoretical models proposed that illustrates the conflict detection and 
resolution mechanism within the DPTs framework. In all three representations, the horizontal 
axis represents time. (A) The serial model; the intuitive system continues to operate until 
tconflict, at which point the deliberate system is optionally activated. (B) The parallel model; 
the intuitive and deliberate system operate at the same time and tconflict does not have a place 
to occur. (C) The Logical Intuition Model (LIM); the intuitive system is divided into 
heuristic and logical intuitions, which operate in parallel, and only if there is a conflict 
between the two, at tconflict, does the deliberate system get optionally activated.12  
                                                
12 From “Bias and conflict: A case for logical intuitions,” by W. De Neys, 2012, Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, p. 34. Copyright 2012 by Wim De Neys. Reprinted with 
permission.  
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Figure 2. The processes and decisions associated with the Three-stages Model (TSM) 
utilizing a DPT framework. Initial responses are generated by Type 1 processing and occur 
within milliseconds in Stage 1. Stage 2 is the conflict monitoring stage and conflict is 
detected or not detected within milliseconds. Stage 3 represents the engagement of Type 2 
processing and whether a person responds with an initial salient response through undetected 
conflict or rationalization processes, or responds with another initial response as a decoupling 
process. T1 = Type 1 processing; T2 = Type 2 processing; IR = Initial response; AR = 
Alternative response.13  
                                                
13 From “What makes us think? A three-stage dual process model of analytic engagement,” 
by G. Pennycook, J. A. Fugelsang, and D. J. Koehler, 2015, Cognitive Psychology, p. 39. 
Copyright 2015 by Elsevier Inc. Reprinted with permission. 
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of mean RT time differences and the proportion of correct (base-rate) 
responses on conflict problems in Experiment 1. Conflict Detection Index refers to the RT 
difference between incorrect (stereotype) conflict responses and overall nonconflict 
responses. The Inhibition Index refers to the RT difference between correct and incorrect 
responses on conflict problems. The Decoupling Index refers to the RT difference between 
correct conflict responses and overall nonconflict responses. Each unit represents one 
participant (i.e., one circle, triangle, and square per participant). Lines show regressions of 
proportion of base-rate responses on RT difference scores.
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Figure 6. Scatterplot of mean RT time differences and the proportion of correct (base-rate) 
responses on conflict problems the base-rate neglect task in Experiment 2. Conflict Detection 
Index refers to the RT difference between incorrect (stereotype) conflict responses and 
overall nonconflict responses. The Inhibition Index refers to the RT difference between 
correct and incorrect responses on conflict problems. The Decoupling Index refers to the RT 
difference between correct conflict responses and overall nonconflict responses. Each unit 
represents one participant (i.e., one circle, triangle, and square per participant). Lines show 
regressions of proportion of base-rate responses on RT difference scores. 
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Figure 7. Average confidence/FOR ratings by problem type for both tasks in Experiment 2. 
Panel A represents the base-rate neglect task. Panel B represents the conditional reasoning 
task. Error bars represent standard errors.  
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Figure 8. Scatterplot of mean RT time differences and the proportion of correct (YES for 
valid and NO for invalid) responses on conflict problems the conditional reasoning task in 
Experiment 2. Conflict Detection Index refers to the RT difference between incorrect 
(stereotype) conflict responses and overall nonconflict responses. The Inhibition Index refers 
to the RT difference between correct and incorrect responses on conflict problems. The 
Decoupling Index refers to the RT difference between correct conflict responses and overall 
nonconflict responses. Each unit represents one participant (i.e., one circle, triangle, and 
square per participant). Lines show regressions of proportion of base-rate responses on RT 
difference scores.
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Base-rate Neglect Problems 
(Adopted from De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008) 
 
Nonconflict Problems 
 
1. David is 21 years old. He lives in the rural area and plays soccer. He drinks darker beer in pints and is very 
witty. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. David is American 
b. David is British 
 
2. Bobby is 23 and works at a nickel refinery. On spare time, Bobby likes to go hunting and enjoys watching 
hockey at the local pub.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Bobby is a man 
b. Bobby is a woman 
 
3. Jocelyne is 34. She is married but has no children. She establishes herself in her career and has many political 
friends. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Jocelyne is a District Attorney  
b. Jocelyne is a waitress  
 
4. Steve is 23. He works during the school year and brings his laptop to classes. He has no girlfriend and hates 
going to parties. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Steve is a computer science major 
b. Steve is a sport management major 
 
5. Rajit is 36. He is a hard worker and loves America. He is religious and spends free time with family when he 
is not running his corner store. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Rajit is American-born   
b. Rajit is an immigrant 
 
6. Beverley is 44 years old. She lives in a house outside the city. She is married and has one son and a dog.  
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Beverley is a doctor 
b. Beverly is a teacher 
 
7. Jack is 36. He is not married and is somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading science fiction 
and writing computer programs. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Jack is an engineer 
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b. Jack is a lawyer 
 
8. Jean is 17 years old and works at the neighborhood McDonalds. Jean likes to go out to watch movies, preferably 
comedies, with friends. 
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Jean is male 
b. Jean is a female 
 
9. Mike is a 26-year-old male. He is married and has two children. He pays taxes on time and drives a mid-size 
car. 
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Mike is a catholic 
b. Mike is a protestant 
 
10. Sean is a 26-year-old male. He is a college graduate and lives in an apartment. He is single and has no 
outstanding school loans. 
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Sean drives a Lexus 
b. Sean drives a Ford 
 
11. Wally is 43 and lives in Dover. He is a serious and orderly man. In his free time he studies the history of the 
British Empire.  
 
What is more likely? 
a. Wally is a personal gym trainer 
b. Wally is a librarian 
 
12. Jamal is 21 and lives near Brooklyn. Jamal has dreadlocks and drives a convertible. He is 6 ft 7 in and very 
athletic.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Jamal is a basketball player 
b. Jamal is a gymnast 
 
13. John is a lawyer. To ease the stress of work, he spends the day drinking tea and the night drinking beer at his 
favorite pub.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. John is Greek 
b. John is English 
 
14. Martine is 26. She is bilingual and reads a lot in her spare time. She is a very fashionable dresser and a great 
cook. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Martine is American 
b. Martine is French 
 
15. Roxy is 20. Her major is Women’s Studies and she volunteers at a women’s shelter. On the weekends, she 
teaches a self-defense class. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Roxy is on the debate team 
  
149 
 
b. Roxy is a cheerleader 
 
 
16. Catherine is 22. She still lives at home along with her two younger sisters. She spends her summers working 
as a lifeguard at a summer camp.  
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Catherine is a history major 
b. Catherine is a French major 
 
17. Christopher is 28 years old. He has a girlfriend and shares an apartment with a friend. He likes watching 
basketball.  
 
What is more likely? 
a. Christopher lives in New York 
b. Christopher lives in Los Angeles 
 
18. Jo is 23 and is finishing a degree in engineering. On Friday nights, Jo likes to go out cruising with friends 
while listening to loud music and drinking beer.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Jo is a man 
b. Jo is a woman 
 
19. Dieter is very well organized and always on time. So on the weekends he likes to unwind a little bit at one of 
his favorite techno clubs.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Dieter is German 
 b. Dieter is Spanish 
 
20. Ian is a 40-year-old male. He lives in the Great Plains and drives a truck. He enjoys listening to country music.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Ian is a farmer 
b. Ian is an office worker 
 
21. Antony is 46 and lives in Boston. He is married and has a PhD in mathematics. In his free time, he works on 
a biography of Sir Isaac Newton. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Antony is a university professor 
b. Antony is a carpenter 
 
22. Bree is 23. She is almost 6 feet tall and has a great figure. She likes to wear new clothes and has a personal 
trainer.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Bree is a model 
b. Bree is a maid 
 
23. Russell is 67 and lives in Georgia. He used to work in the oil business and owns a ranch. He believes in the 
right to bear arms and in traditional marriage values. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Russell is a member of the Green party 
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b. Russell is a Republican 
 
24. Diego is 25 and has been married for four years. He and his wife have three kids. Diego likes to take a siesta 
in the afternoon. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Diego is a German  
b. Diego is a Mexican 
 
25. Nigel is 42. He is married and has four kids. In his free time, he likes to build model planes and to spend 
time with his children.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Nigel is a bouncer 
b. Nigel is a civil engineer 
 
Conflict Problems 
 
1. Joussef is a 24-year old male who recently married. He has black hair and a dark skin. In his free time he 
likes to read the Koran. 
 
What is more likely? 
a. Joussef is from Finland 
b. Joussef is from Iran 
 
2. Luciano is 42. He is quite intelligent. His favorite drink is whiskey and most nights he does not get a lot of 
sleep.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Luciano is a professional boxer 
b. Luciano is a professional poker player 
 
3. Michael is 21 and has a girlfriend. He is self-assured and finds it important to be well-dressed. He is in a debate 
club and likes sailing. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Michael is a law school student 
b. Michael is a musician 
 
4. Andrew is 37 years old. His favorite color is green. In his spare time, he likes to go jogging in his neighborhood 
and to do work on his car.  
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Andrew is an office clerk 
b. Andrew is a dentist 
 
5. Bob lives in Buffalo. Bob’s favorite color is blue. He has a wife Cheryl and a son named Peter. Bob likes to 
watch television.  
 
What is more likely?  
a. Bob is 40 years old 
b. Bob is 60 years old  
 
6. Sholan is 26. He lives in LA and likes to wear designer clothes. He acts somewhat stuck-up and plays golf 
with his father.  
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 What is more likely? 
a. Sholan is a plumber 
b. Sholan is a stock broker 
7. Devon is 20. He grew up in a poor family in a neglected neighborhood in Chicago and didn’t finish high 
school. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Devon is a rapper 
b. Devon is a violin player 
 
8. Paul is 34. He lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb. He is well spoken and very interested in politics. He 
invests a lot of time in his career.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Paul is a nurse 
b. Paul is a doctor 
 
9. Casey is a 36-year-old writer. Casey has two brothers and one sister. Casey likes running and watching a good 
romantic comedy.  
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Casey is a man 
b. Casey is a woman 
 
10. Marco is 16. He loves to play soccer with his friends, after which they all go out for pizza or to someone’s 
house for homemade pasta.  
 
  What is more likely? 
a. Marco is Swedish 
b. Marco is Italian 
 
11. Stan is 36. He married his college sweetheart after graduating and has two kids. He doesn’t drink or smoke 
but works long hours.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Stan is a dentist 
b. Stan is a rock singer 
 
12. Reid is 29. He is quite muscular and is in good shape. He is tanned and has a nice girlfriend. 
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Reid is a professional surfer 
b. Reid is a professional bowler  
 
13. Geoff is from Texas. He is against the president’s foreign policy and he throws a party every July 4th.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Geoff is a social worker 
b. Geoff is a Marine 
 
14. Angie is 26. She became pregnant at age 16. She’s a single mom and lives with her mother. Anita has severe 
debts.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Angie is an accountant 
b. Angie is unemployed  
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15. Jesse lives in the suburbs, has two kids and drives a brown minivan. In the summer, Jesse likes to spend time 
at the lake.  
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Jesse is a man 
b. Jesse is a woman 
 
16. Matt is 20 and lives in downtown San Francisco. Matt’s favorite food is pasta with meatballs. His parents are 
living in Seattle.  
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Matt is a Computer Science major 
b. Matt is an English major 
 
17. Trina is 36. When not working, she likes to spend time in the local café, reading poetry and drinking chai 
lattes. She often changes her hair color.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Trina is a painter 
b. Trina is a doctor 
 
18. Kelly is 9. Kelly has a little sister and bugs her all the time. Kelly likes to play with toy trucks and wants to 
become a famous hockey player.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Kelly is a girl 
b. Kelly is a boy 
 
19. Jason is 29 and has lived his whole live in New York. He has green colored eyes and black hair. He drives a 
light-gray colored car.  
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Jason is a pool player 
b. Jason is a basketball player 
 
20. Lars is 6 ft tall and lives together with his girlfriend in an apartment in the city. He weighs 175 pounds and 
has short hair. 
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Lars is Italian 
b. Lars is Norwegian 
 
21. Lilly is 37. Her husband is a veterinarian and they have 3 kids. She is committed to her family and always 
watches the daily cartoon shows with the kids.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Lilly is a kindergarten teacher 
b. Lilly is an executive manager 
 
22. Randy is 29. He is quite extraverted and very imaginative. He says he doesn’t care about money and is very 
interested in foreign cultures.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Randy is a theatre actor 
b. Randy is a butcher 
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23. Les is 5 ft 6 tall. Les likes cooking a nice meal and frequently babysits for friends. In high school, Les did 
well in English but not so well in math.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Les is a man 
b. Les is a woman 
 
24. Charlie is 13. Charlie's favorite subject is art. Charlie loves shopping and sleepovers with friends to gossip 
about other kids at school.  
 
 What is more likely? 
a. Charlie is a girl 
b. Charlie is a boy 
 
25. Fred is 50 years old. He is married and has two daughters. Every morning he reads the newspaper before 
going to work.   
 
 What is more likely?  
a. Fred is from New York 
b. Fred is from Ohio  
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Appendix B: Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Adopted from Frederick, 2005) 
 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
_____ cents  
 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 
widgets? _____ minutes 
 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to 
cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? _____ days  
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Appendix C: Need for Cognition Scale 
(Adapted from Petty, Cacioppo, & Kao, 1984) 
 
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of you or of what 
you believe. For example, if the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you or of what you believe about 
yourself (not at all like you) please place a "1" on the line to the left of the statement. If the statement is 
extremely characteristic of you or of what you believe about yourself (very much like you) please place a "5" on 
the line to the left of the statement. You should use the following scale as you rate each of the statements below. 
 
1    2    3    4   5 
extremely   somewhat   uncertain   somewhat  extremely 
uncharacteristic   uncharacteristic      characteristic  characteristic 
of me    of me       of me   of me 
 
1. I prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.** 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking 
abilities.** 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in depth about 
something.** 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to.** 
8. I prefer to think about small daily projects to long term ones.** 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.** 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.** 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does 
not require much thought. 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of mental effort.** 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.** 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
 
Note: ** = reversed coded item.  
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Appendix D: Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale 
(Adapted from Stanovich & West, 1997) 
 
For each of the statements below, mark the alternative that best describes your opinion. There are no right or 
wrong answers so do not spend too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing that comes to mind is 
probably the best response. 
 
Response options: 1 – Disagree strongly, 2 – Disagree moderately, 3 – Disagree slightly, 4 – Agree slightly, 5 – 
Agree moderately, 6 – Agree strongly 
 
1. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict 
the freedom of certain political groups. (Reversed Scored) 
 
2. What beliefs you hold have more to do with your own personal character than the experiences that may have 
given rise to them. (Reversed Scored) 
 
3. I tend to classify people as either for me or against me. (Reversed Scored) 
 
4. A person should always consider new possibilities. 
 
5. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth. 
(Reversed Scored) 
 
6. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness. (Reversed Scored) 
 
7. I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues. (Reversed  
Scored) 
 
8. I think there are many wrong ways, but only one right way, to almost anything. (Reversed  
Scored) 
 
9. It makes me happy and proud when someone famous holds the same beliefs that I do.  
(Reversed Scored) 
 
10. Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than through waiting for good 
fortune.  
 
11. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.  
(Reversed Scored) 
 
12. Abandoning a previous belief is a sign of strong character. 
 
13. No one can talk me out of something I know is right. (Reversed Scored) 
 
14. Basically, I know everything I need to know about the important things in life. (Reversed  
Scored) 
 
15. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear against them. (Reversed 
Scored) 
 
16. Considering too many different opinions often leads to bad decisions. (Reversed Scored) 
 
17. There are basically two kinds of people in this world, good and bad. (Reversed Scored) 
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18. I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people's lifestyles. 
 
19. Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can be made against them. 
(Reversed Scored) 
 
20. Most people just don't know what's good for them. (Reversed Scored)  
 
21. It is a noble thing when someone holds the same beliefs as their parents. (Reversed Scored)  
 
22. Coming to decisions quickly is a sign of wisdom. (Reversed Scored)  
 
23. I believe that loyalty to one's ideals and principles is more important than "open-mindedness." (Reversed 
Scored)  
 
24. Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world there is probably only one which is correct. 
(Reversed Scored)  
 
25. My beliefs would not have been very different if I had been raised by a different set of parents. (Reversed 
Scored)  
 
26. If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it.  
 
27. I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies have may be valid for 
them.  
 
28. Even if my environment (family, neighborhood, schools) had been different, I probably would have the 
same religious views. (Reversed Scored)  
 
29. There is nothing wrong with being undecided about many issues.  
 
30. I believe that laws and social policies should change to reflect the needs of a changing world.  
 
31. My blood boils over whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong. (Reversed Scored)  
 
32. I believe that the "new morality" of permissiveness is no morality at all. (Reversed Scored)  
 
33. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with your established beliefs. (Reversed Scored)  
 
34. Someone who attacks my beliefs is not insulting me personally.  
 
35. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its members cannot exist for long. (Reversed 
Scored)  
 
36. Often, when people criticize me, they don't have their facts straight. (Reversed Scored)  
 
37. Beliefs should always be revised in response to new information or evidence.  
 
38. I think that if people don't know what they believe in by the time they're 25, there's something wrong with 
them. (Reversed Scored)  
 
39. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and mislead them. (Reversed Scored)  
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40. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions. (Reversed Scored)  
 
41. People should always take into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs.   
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Appendix E: Conditional Reasoning Problems 
(Adopted from Thompson, 1994) 
 
NS Type Pragmatic Context Temporal Sequence Statement 
+N+S Causal A If butter is heated, then it melts 
+N+S Causal B If butter melts, then it has been heated. 
+N+S Causal A If water is heated to 100 degrees centigrade, then 
it boils. 
+N+S Causal B If water boils, then it has been heated to 100 
degrees centigrade.  
+N+S Definition A If an animal is warm-blooded, then it is a 
mammal. 
+N+S Definition B If an animal is a mammal, then it is warm-
blooded. 
+N+S Definition A If a person is someone’s mother’s mother, then 
she is that person’s maternal grandmother.  
+N+S Definition B If a person is someone’s maternal grandmother, 
then she is that person’s mother’s mother.  
-N+S Causal A If the car is out of gas, then it stalls. 
-N+S Causal B If the car stalls, then it is out of gas.  
-N+S Causal A If the dog tracks mud on the floor, then the floor 
is dirty. 
-N+S Causal B If the floor is dirty, then the dog has tracked mud 
on it.  
-N+S Definition A If an animal is a robin, then it is a bird.  
-N+S Definition B If an animal is a bird, then it is a robin 
-N+S Definition A If a card has a jack on it, then it is a face card. 
-N+S Definition B If a card is a face card, then it has a jack on it.  
+N-S Causal A If the T.V. is plugged in, then it works. 
+N-S Causal B If the T.V. works, then it is plugged in. 
+N-S Causal A If the car has gas in it, then it runs. 
+N-S Causal B If the car runs, then it has gas in it.  
+N-S Definition A If a plant has roots, then it is a tree. 
+N-S Definition B If a plant is a tree, then it has roots. 
+N-S Definition A If a figure has 4 sides, then it is a square. 
+N-S Definition B If a figure is a square, then it has four sides.  
-N-S Causal A If the weather conditions are bad, then the plane 
will crash. 
-N-S Causal B If the plan has crashed, then the weather 
conditions have been bad.  
-N-S Causal A If a person eats toffee, then they get cavities. 
-N-S Causal B If a person gets cavities, then they eat toffee.  
-N-S Definition  A If a piece of fruit is red, then it is an apple.  
-N-S Definition B If a piece of fruit is an apple, then it is red.  
-N-S Definition  A If a piece of furniture is made of wood, then it is 
chair.  
-N-S Definition  B If a piece of furniture is a chair, then it is made of 
wood.  
 
 
